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THE FUTURE OF GUN CONTROL LAWS POST-MCDONALD AND HELLER
AND THE DEATH OF ONE-GUN-PER-MONTH LEGISLATION
MICHAEL J. HABIB
In McDonald v. Chicago, the Supreme Court incorporated the Second
Amendment individual right to bear arms elucidated in District of
Columbia v. Heller, and made the right applicable to state action. While
Heller defined the right, McDonald clarified some of the justifications for
limiting that right through appropriate government regulation.
However, because Second Amendment jurisprudence is still in its
infancy, the Court conspicuously left many questions unanswered
Included amongst those questions is: What is the exact breadth and depth
of the right to bear arms?; To what extent may the government permissibly
restrict the right to bear arms?; and, What is the level of scrutiny that
ought to apply when courts consider the constitutionality of restrictive
regulatory schemes that seek to abridge the right to bear arms?
Through a comprehensive and in-depth analysis of Heller and
McDonald, as well as an overview assessment of the history of the right to
bear arms in Colonial America and British common law, this Note argues
that the right to bear arms is a pre-existing right held by all Americans,
predating the Second Amendment, and is a broad right to possess any
firearm not specifically designed for military use, at most times and places
except those proscribed for a compelling governmental purpose, and for
any lawful purpose, as defined by permissible government regulation.
Lastly, this Note argues that the Second Amendment does not fit
squarely within the established levels of scrutiny. Rather, the Court ought
to apply an ill-defined and rarely-utilized modus operandi of judicial
scrutiny that the author calls "sliding-scale scrutiny," where the level of
scrutiny varies depending on the effect of the regulation on the core of the
right. Under such a level of scrutiny, many restrictive regulatory schemes,
such as one-gun-per-month laws, which strike directly at the core of the
right, should be held unconstitutional.
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THE FUTURE OF GUN CONTROL LAWS POST-McDoNALD AND HELLER
AND THE DEATH OF ONE-GUN-PER-MONTH LEGISLATION
MICHAEL J. HABIB*
I. INTRODUCTION'
The Second Amendment right to bear arms has been a source of
confusion, debate, and, occasionally, litigation, legislation, and regulation,
since the adoption of the Bill of Rights in 1791. Recently, the U.S.
Supreme Court, in McDonald v. City of Chicago,2 overruled almost two
hundred years of case law,3 holding that the Second Amendment right to
bear arms is applicable to the states by virtue of the Fourteenth
. American University of Beirut, Lebanon, 2006; Suffolk University, B.S., summa cum laude,
2009; University of Connecticut School of Law, Juris Doctor Candidate, 2012. This Note would not
have been possible without the guidance, support, and advice of my advisor, Professor Richard S. Kay.
Also, special thanks to Professor Constance Rudnick and Massachusetts State Senator Steven A.
Baddour for reviewing this Note, Dean Erwin Chemerinsky for his assistance with the constitutional
analysis, Patrick J. Charles for his critique of my historical analysis, and my fellow colleagues from the
Connecticut Law Review for their tireless efforts and feedback. All errors contained herein are mine
alone.
, I make no judgment as to whether Heller and McDonald were properly decided in light of the
history of colonial laws regulating gun possession and the evidence surrounding the adoption of the
Second Amendment. This Note assumes, arguendo, that the historical analysis of the Supreme Court in
both the Heller and McDonald decisions is correct. The focus of this Note is the effect of these
decisions on future gun control regulations, not whether the decisions are correct or historically factual.
Several noted academics and historians, including Patrick J. Charles, dispute the veracity of the
Supreme Court's recitation of Second Amendment history. For a thorough history of the right to bear
arms, see generally PATRICK J. CHARLES, THE SECOND AMENDMENT: THE INTENT AND ITS
INTERPRETATION BY THE STATES AND THE SUPREME COURT (2009); Patrick J. Charles, "Arms for
Their Defence"?: An Historical, Legal, and Textual Analysis of the English Right to Have Arms and
Whether the Second Amendment Should be Incorporated in McDonald v. City of Chicago, 57 CLEV.
ST. L. REV. 351 (2009). But see JOYCE LEE MALCOLM, TO KEEP AND BEAR ARMS: THE ORIGINS OF
AN ANGLO-AMERICAN RIGHT (1996) (providing an historical analysis of the English influence on the
addition of the right to bear arms to the Bill of Rights).
2 130 S. Ct. 3020 (2010). After McDonald, Chicago revised its gun laws to permit the lawful
ownership of handguns, but also to prohibit the sale of firearms within the city limits. CHICAGO, ILL.
MUN. CODE §§ 4-144-010, 8-20-100 (2010). In light of McDonald, the new Chicago gun laws are now
the subject of ongoing litigation. See Complaint for Declaratory Judgment and Injunctive Relief at 1
18-20, Benson v. City of Chicago, No. 1: IOCV04184, 2010 WL 2796263 (N.D. I11. July 7, 2010).
3 See Miller v. Texas, 153 U.S. 535, 538 (1894) (upholding the constitutionality of a state gun law
on the basis that the Second Amendment restricts only federal, not state, power); Presser v. Illinois, 116
U.S. 252, 265 (1886) (holding that the Second Amendment limits the power of Congress and the
national government, not the states); United States v. Cruikshank, 92 U.S. 542, 553 (1875) (holding
that the Second Amendment restricts only the powers of the national government); see also Baron v.
City of Baltimore, 32 U.S. 243, 247 (1833) (holding that the takings clause of the Fifth Amendment is
not applicable to the states).
Amendment Due Process Clause.4 This is a remarkable deviation from
previous holdings of the Supreme Court and lower courts, which refused to
extend the right to bear arms to state gun control legislation.
This arguably 5 significant decision will likely change the course of
existing and future legislation relative to gun control on the federal and
state levels. Existing gun control laws seek to limit-and at times entirely
prohibit-access to firearms, the ability to purchase, carry, or use firearms,
and the frequency with which one may procure firearms. It is the latter
regulation that may be most suspect and ripe for constitutional review
under the newfound fundamental right to keep and bear a handgun in the
home for self-defense.
Currently, three states have enacted laws that restrict the lawful
purchase of a handgun to one firearm per month.6 Massachusetts Governor
Deval Patrick previously proposed similar legislation for the
Commonwealth.7 These so-called one-gun-per-month laws have not been
constitutionally challenged post-McDonald. While the proposed
Massachusetts legislation failed to pass the legislature before the formal
legislative session ended on July 31, 2010,8 a broad and expansive reading
4 McDonald, 130 S. Ct. at 3026. It is worth noting that the opinion in McDonald was a plurality
decision, where Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Alito, Kennedy, and Scalia agreed on incorporation
through the Due Process Clause, while Justice Thomas, who concurred in the judgment in part, actually
argued incorporation through the Privileges or Immunities Clause. This plurality split can be used to
argue that the question about whether the Second Amendment is incorporated via the Due Process
Clause or the Privileges or Immunities Clause is still unresolved. I would argue that, because Justice
Thomas concurred in the judgment, while he disagreed with the use of the Due Process Clause, the
Second Amendment is nonetheless incorporated through the Due Process Clause because every
enumerated right that has been incorporated has been through the Due Process Clause. This Note
accepts this assumption. See contra Patrick J. Charles, The Second Amendment Standard of Review
after McDonald: "Historical Guideposts" and the Missing Arguments in McDonald v. City of
Chicago, 2 AKRON J. CONST. L. & POL'Y 7, 8-9 (2010) (arguing that the Second Amendment right to
bear arms only applies to citizens because it was not actually incorporated through the Due Process
clause, which applies to all persons).
'See Charles, supra note 4, at 10 ("[T]he McDonald decision did little to change the legal
landscape of 'gun rights' as we know them .... ").
6 See CAL. PENAL CODE § 27535(a) (West 2012); MD. CODE ANN., PUB. SAFETY § 5-128(b)
(LexisNexis 2011); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:58-2(a)(7) (West Supp. 2011). At the time of this writing,
Virginia also had a one-gun-per-month law, VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-308.2:2(P)(1) (2009); however,
that law was repealed on February 28, 2012, 2012 Va. Acts ch. 37.
7H.B. 4102 § 6, 186th Gen. Ct., 1st Ann. Sess. (Mass. 2009), available at
http://www.mass.gov/legis/bills/house/186/ht04pdf/ht04102.pdf.
s See H.B. 2012, Rule 12A, at 25, 186th Gen. Ct., 1st Ann. Sess. (Mass. 2009) (stating that "all
formal business of the second annual session shall be concluded no later than the last day of July of that
calendar year"). At all times, even after the end of formal sessions, the Senate and House of
Representatives of the Massachusetts General Court are required by Part 11, ch. 1, § Ill, art. VI and art.
VIII of the Massachusetts Constitution to meet once every seventy-two hours in informal sessions.
However, during informal sessions, no controversial matters may be considered and a unanimous vote
of the members present is required for all matters. H.B. 2011, Rule 44, 186th Gen. Ct., 1st Ann. Sess.
(Mass. 2009); S.B. 5, Rule 5a, 186th Gen. Ct., 1st Ann. Sess. (Mass. 2009).
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of the McDonald decision calls into question the constitutionality of
existing and proposed one-gun-per-month laws.
Massachusetts, with some of the most restrictive gun control laws in
the nation, 9 will likely be the springboard for significant litigation relative
to the extent to which states may limit the constitutional right to bear arms.
The Supreme Court in District of Columbia v. Heller" and McDonald did
not fully define the scope of the right to bear arms and did not establish a
level of scrutiny for challenges to gun control laws. This leaves open the
possibility that this Second Amendment right will be afforded the same
strict scrutiny as other fundamental constitutional rights; or, perhaps more
likely, the level of scrutiny will be something less than strict scrutiny, with
the possibility for stringent regulation and restriction of gun ownership but
not its absolute prohibition.
After a review of Second Amendment jurisprudence over the past two
hundred years, this Note will define the constitutionally protected right to
bear arms as a right to possess almost any firearm, at most locations, for
any lawful purpose in accordance with state and federal law; will establish
that the level of scrutiny for laws that abridge the Second Amendment right
to bear arms should be a "sliding-scale" review, where the level of scrutiny
changes with the effect the regulation has on the right; and that the
proposed Massachusetts one-gun-per-month law, as well as existing one-
gun-per-month laws, will likely be held to violate the Second Amendment
when properly assessed under a strict-scrutiny analysis.
II. THE BILL OF RIGHTS
A. Incorporation of the Bill of Rights
Incorporation is the process adopted by the Supreme Court after
ratification of the Fourteenth Amendment, by which certain federal rights
are made applicable to the state action on an individual basis by virtue of
the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment." The first eight
amendments of the United States Constitution establish the protection of
certain, identified (enumerated) individual rights that the federal
government may not infringe. With one notable exception,1 2 it was not
until 1833 that the Supreme Court took the opportunity to address whether
9 Massachusetts, even dating to the early days of this country and the colonial period, has had
some of the nation's most restrictive gun-control regulations, including when and where guns could be
discharged. See Robert H. Churchill, Gun Regulation, the Police Power, and the Right to Keep Arms in
Early America: The Legal Context of the Second Amendment, 25 LAW & HIST. REv. 139, 162-63
(2007) (detailing the regulation of guns by Massachusetts' colonial legislature).
'0 554 U.S. 570 (2008).
" McDonald v. City of Chicago, 130 S. Ct. 3020, 3037 (2010).
12 See Houston v. Moore, 18 U.S. (5 Wheat.) 1, 52-53 (1820) (noting that the Second Amendment
does not prohibit a state from raising a militia).
.343
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the protections of these rights applied only to the federal government or to
state and local governments as well. In Barron v. Mayor of Baltimore,13
Chief Justice John Marshall held that because the framers had not indicated
in "plain and intelligible language"' 4 that the Bill of Rights applies to the
states, the restrictions of the first ten amendments only apply to the federal
government.15
It is worth noting that the First Amendment is the only amendment in
the Bill of Rights that begins with the words "Congress shall make no
,016law .... None of the other amendments in the Bill of Rights has such a
preamble restricting the protection of those rights to the actions of
Congress only. However, when faced with this linguistic and textual
argument, Chief Justice Marshall flatly rejected it, claiming that the
"limitations on power ... are ... applicable to the government created by
the instrument,"' 7 in this case, the federal government. Consequently, one
would expect that the duty was left to individual state constitutions to limit
the power of state governments.'
8
With the adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment forty-five years later,
the possibility arose that the protections of the Bill of Rights may apply to
state and local governments. Justice Hugo Black, in his famous dissent in
Adamson v. California19 and concurrence in Duncan v. Louisiana,20 argued
that the first eight amendments to the Constitution apply to the states
because of the Privileges or Immunities Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment.2' In the Slaughter-House Cases,22 decided over half a
century before Justice Black's statements, the Supreme Court had rejected
such an argument, querying:
[w]as it the purpose of the fourteenth amendment, by the
simple declaration that no State should make or enforce
any law which shall abridge the privileges and immunities
of citizens of the United States, to transfer the security and
protection of all the civil rights which we have mentioned,
from the States to the Federal government? .. .We are
convinced that no such results were intended by the
'3 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 243 (1833).
14 Id. at 250.
" Id. at 247, 250-51.
16 U.S. CONST. amend. i.
17 Barron, 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) at 247.
18 id
19 332 U.S. 46, 71-72 (1947) (Black, J., dissenting).
20 391 U.S. 145, 163 (1968) (Black, J., concurring).
21 Id. at 166.
22 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36 (1873).
[Vol. 44:1339
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Congress which proposed these amendments, nor by the
legislatures of the States which ratified them.
23
Fifty-years later,24 in Gitlow v. New York,25 the Supreme Court began
to use the concept of selective incorporation 26 to make provisions of the
Bill of Rights applicable to the states by virtue of the Due Process Clause
of the Fourteenth Amendment. Since that time, the Court has slowly
incorporated most of the provisions of the Bill of Rights as applicable to
the states.28
B. The History of Second Amendment Jurisprudence
1. Refusal to Incorporate
On numerous occasions before McDonald, the Supreme Court refused
to incorporate the Second Amendment right to bear arms. Before the
ratification of the Fourteenth Amendment, in Dred Scott v. Sandford,
Chief Justice Taney opined (ad horribilis) that, if African Americans were
considered citizens, they would be "entitled to the privileges and
immunities of citizens .... [A]nd it would give them the full liberty... to
231 d. at 77-78.
24 One can argue that the doctrine of selective incorporation actually began in 1897 with Chicago,
Burlington, & Quincy Railroad Co. v. City of Chicago, 166 U.S. 226 (1897), where the Court upheld a
land-taking by the city of Chicago where just compensation was paid to the owner. Id. at 235-36, 257-
58. The Court held that a land-taking by a city or state, for public use, without just compensation,
would be repugnant to the Fourteenth Amendment due process clause. Id. at 241. However, there was
a state constitutional provision that guaranteed due process and just compensation for land-takings and
the Court upheld compensation of just one dollar, which was awarded after a trial. Id. at 241, 247.
Indeed, the case was more about whether due process was afforded, rather than whether it required just
compensation under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments.
25 268 U.S. 652 (1925).
26 Selective incorporation is the process by which the Supreme Court decides, on a case-by-case
basis, whether a constitutionally protected right is applicable to state action by virtue of the Fourteenth
Amendment Due Process Clause. See, e.g., Michael Kent Curtis, The Fourteenth Amendment:
Recalling What the Court Forgot, 56 DRAKE L. REV. 911, 961--64 (2001).
27 Gitlow, 268 U.S. at 666.
28 To date, the Supreme Court has either refused to incorporate, or has not had the opportunity to
rule on incorporating, the Third Amendment freedom from quartering soldiers, the Fifth Amendment
right to an indictment by grand jury, and the Seventh Amendment right to a jury trial in civil cases. See
Minneapolis & St. Louis R.R. Co. v. Bombolis, 241 U.S. 211, 217 (1916) (refusing to incorporate the
Seventh Amendment right to ajury trial in civil cases); Hurtado v. California, 110 U.S. 516, 538 (1884)
(refusing to incorporate the Fifth Amendment right to indictment by a grand jury). While the Supreme
Court has not ruled on incorporating the Third Amendment freedom from quartering soldiers, the
Second Circuit, in Engblom v. Carey, 677 F.2d 957, 961 (2d Cir. 1982), held that "the Third
Amendment is incorporated into the Fourteenth Amendment for application to the states." For an
extensive discussion of the historical debate over selective incorporation, the rights that have been
incorporated, and by which cases, see ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: PRINCIPLES AND
POLICIES 511-19 (4th ed. 2011).
29 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1856).
20 L 11 2]
keep and carry arms wherever they went."30 It appears that at that time
Chief Justice Taney considered the right to bear arms to be an individual
right afforded to all the citizens of the United States through the Privileges
and Immunities Clause of Article WV of the Constitution. 3' However, the
Court never adopted this interpretation.
After adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment, in United States v.
Cruickshank,2 the Supreme Court held that the Second Amendment
"declares that it shall not be infringed; but this ... means no more than that
it shall not be infringed by Congress. This is one of the amendments that
has no other effect than to restrict the powers of the national
government... ,,33 Similarly, in Presser v. Illinois, 34 the Supreme Court
relied on Cruickshank in holding that the Second Amendment "is a
limitation only upon the power of Congress and the National government,
and not upon that of the States., 35 Between Presser, in 1886, and Heller,
in 2008, the Supreme Court rarely revisited Second Amendment
incorporation.36
2. The Collective-Right and Individual-Right Theories
While the issue of Second Amendment incorporation was not fully
revisited until Heller and McDonald, much of Second Amendment
jurisprudence has revolved around whether the right is a collective or an
individual right. Because the Second Amendment right is enforceable
against the federal government, courts sought to define whether the right is
a collective right to bear arms with respect to a well-regulated militia, or if
it is an individual right to keep and bear arms for lawful, personal
purposes.
The collective-right theory was gleaned from Presser and United
States v. Miller.37 In Miller, the Court held that the right to bear arms must
bear "some reasonable relationship to the preservation or efficiency of a
well regulated militia" with the "obvious purpose to assure the
continuation and render possible the effectiveness of [Congress' power to
raise a militia] .... ,38 Based on this collective-right view that has gained
30 Id. at 416-17.
31 U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 2 ("The Citizens of each State shall be entitled to all Privileges and
Immunities of Citizens in the several States.").
32 92 U.S. 542 (1875).331 d. at 553.
4 116 U.S. 252 (1886).
31 Id. at 265.
36 1 say "rarely" because on two post-Presser occasions the Supreme Court reaffirmed that the
right to bear arms was not applicable to the states. See Robertson v. Baldwin, 165 U.S. 275, 281-82
(1987); Miller v. Texas, 153 U.S. 535, 538 (1894).
37 307 U.S. 174 (1939).
38 Id. at 178; accord U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 15 ("The Congress shall have Power ... To
provide for calling forth the Militia to execute the Laws of the Union, suppress Insurrections and repel
CONNECTICUT LA W REVIEW [Vol. 44:13391346
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support since Miller, the Court has held that a states' right to raise a militia
may not be infringed by the federal government because the Second
Amendment protects it.39 In addition, myriad state courts and every federal
appellate court, with the exception of the Fifth Circuit,40 have relied on
stare decisis in holding that the right to bear arms is a collective right vis-
A-vis maintaining a well-regulated militia.4 '
Complementing the judicial interpretation, there is a large body of
scholarly work dedicated to the collective-right theory. One scholar asserts
that, based on an historical analysis of the drafting and ratification of the
Second Amendment, the well-regulated militia clause is a textual
introduction to the right to bear arms, explicitly modifying its purpose to
permit the possession of firearms only as "necessary to maintain the well-
regulated militia.' 42
Conversely, several courts and scholars have advanced the theory that
the right to bear arms is an individual, fundamental right protected by the
Constitution and applicable to the states by virtue of the Fourteenth
Amendment. The Second Amendment clearly states that the "right of the
people to keep and bear Arms, shall not be infringed. 43 The phrase "shall
not be infringed" implies that there is a pre-existing right to keep and bear
arms that predates the Constitution and the government may not infringe
upon that right. However, the exact breadth of this pre-existing right is
unclear. Indeed, many state constitutions that pre-date the U.S.
Constitution (and some subsequently authored) guarantee a right to bear
arms; some guarantee an individual right; some guarantee a right to bear
arms explicitly for self-defense; and others guarantee a collective-right.
4
Invasions ...."). However, the Supreme Court did not actually establish or endorse a collective right
theory in Miller. See District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 620-23 (2008).
39 See Lewis v. United States, 445 U.S. 55, 65-66 n.8 (1980) (citing United States v. Miller, 307
U.S. 174, 178 (1939)).
40 United States v. Emerson, 270 F.3d 203, 232 (5th Cir. 2001) ("The plain meaning of the right
of the people to keep arms is that it is an individual, rather than a collective, right and is not limited to
keeping arms while engaged in active military service or as a member of a select militia such as the
National Guard.").
41 For a list of cases by various state courts and each federal appellate court, see Brief of the
American Bar Association as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioners, District of Columbia v. Heller,
554 U.S. 570 (2008) (No. 07-290), 2008 WL 136349 at *10 n.3.
42 Andrew D. Herz, Gun Crazy: Constitutionally False Consciousness and Dereliction of
Dialogic Responsibility, 75 B.U. L. REV. 57, 57-58, 64 (1995); accord David C. Williams, Response,
The Unitary Second Amendment, 73 N.Y.U. L. REV. 822, 822 (1998) (responding to Eugene Volokh,
The Commonplace SecondAmendment, 73 N.Y.U. L. REV. 793 (1998)).
43 U.S. CONST. amend. II.
"See District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 600-03 (2008) (noting that pre-Second
Amendment, the Massachusetts, North Carolina, Pennsylvania, and Vermont constitutions guaranteed
an individual right to bear arms, and the post-Second Amendment constitutions of Alabama,
Connecticut, Indiana, Kentucky, Maine, Mississippi, Missouri, Ohio, and Tennessee guaranteed a
similar, individual right). But cf Charles, supra note 4, at 41-56 (arguing that many pre-Second
2Oi2l
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It was with this background in mind that some courts and scholars
developed the individual right theory.
Several state courts have interpreted the Second Amendment to bestow
an individual right to bear arms,45 though a state court's interpretation of a
federal Constitutional right has no legal precedent on federal courts. On
the federal level, the United States District Court for the Northern District
of Illinois held that "whenever required by the federal government or
absent any regulation whatsoever, an individual has the right to keep and
bear arms., 46  Similarly, the Fifth Circuit, in United States v. Emerson,
held that "[t]he plain meaning of the right of the people to keep arms is that
it is an individual, rather than a collective, right and is not limited to
keeping arms while engaged in active military service . . . ,4' In addition,
Justice Scalia wrote (extra-judicially) that the Founding Fathers "thought
the right of self-defense to be absolutely fundamental" and that, in
codifying the right to bear arms in the Bill of Rights, "sought to protect
those liberties" for fear that some "future generation might wish to
abandon liberties that they considered essential.'A8
In addition to the judicial support for an individual-right theory, there
is also significant practical and academic support for such a reading.49 In
1934, U.S. Attorney General Homer S. Cummings testified before the
House Committee on Ways and Means in support of the National Firearms
Act of 1934. Attorney General Cummings testified to the committee that
an outright prohibition of firearms would pose a possible constitutional
issue.50 Attorney General John Ashcroft, in a 2001 letter to National Rifle
Association Institute for Legislative Action Executive Director James Jay
Baker, stated that it was his "unequivocal[] ... view that the text and the
original intent of the Second Amendment clearly protect the right of
individuals to keep and bear firearms." 51 Furthermore, even Congress has
Amendment state constitutional provisions, while securing some right to bear arms, do not bestow as
broad and encompassing right as Justice Alito argues in Heller).
45 See Nunn v. State, 1 Ga. 243, 251 (1846); State v. Chandler, 5 La. Ann. 489, 490 (1850).
46 Quilici v. Viii. of Morton Grove, 532 F. Supp. 1169, 1182 (N.D. Ill. 1981), aff'd, 695 F.2d 261,
271 (7th Cir. 1982).
4' 270 F.3d 203, 232 (5th Cir. 2001).
48 Antonin Scalia, Common-Law Courts in a Civil-Law System: The Role of United States Federal
Courts in Interpreting the Constitution and Laws, in A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION: FEDERAL
COURTS AND THE LAW 3, 43 (Amy Gutmann ed., 1997).
4 9 See, e.g., AKHIL REED AMAR, THE BILL OF RIGHTS: CREATION AND RECONSTRUCTION 46-59,
257-66 (1998); 1 LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 894-903 (3d ed. 2000);
Don B. Kates, Jr., Handgun Prohibition and the Original Meaning of the Second Amendment, 82
MICH. L. REv. 204, 258 (1983); Sanford Levinson, Comment, The Embarrassing Second Amendment,
99 YALE L.J. 637, 646-47 (1989).
50 National Firearms Act: Hearing on H.R. 9066 Before the H. Comm. on Ways & Means, 73rd
Cong. 4, 13, 19 (1934) (statement of the Hon. Homer S. Cummings, Att'y Gen. of the United States).
51 Letter from John Ashcroft, Att'y Gen., to James Jay Baker, Exec. Dir., Nat'l Rifle Assoc., Inst.
for Legislative Action (May 17, 2001), available at http://www.nraila.org/images/Ashcroft.pdf.
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declared, "[t]he Second Amendment to the United States Constitution
protects the rights of individuals, including those who are not members of
a militia or engaged in military service or training, to keep and bear
arms. 52
III. INCORPORATION OF THE SECOND AMENDMENT
A. District of Columbia v. Heller
In 2008, the Supreme Court adopted the individual-right theory,
creating the necessary precursor for full incorporation of the Second
Amendment, though incorporation did not occur until 2010. In Heller, the
Court granted certiorari to assess the constitutionality of District of
Columbia laws that essentially prohibited the possession of loaded, usable
handguns, even in the home for purposes of self-defense.53
The Supreme Court undertook a comprehensive, linguistic analysis of
the Second Amendment, holding that the amendment is comprised of a
prefatory clause ("A well regulated Militia") and an operative clause ("the
right of the people to keep and bear Arms").54 Following the cannons of
statutory interpretation, the prefatory clause does not limit the operative
clause, but rather resolves any ambiguities.55 In interpreting the meaning
of the operative clause, the Court held that the phrase "right of the People"
must be read as it is in other parts of the Constitution, as an individual
right.56 In interpreting the phrase "to keep and bear Arms," the Court held
that "Arms" means "weapons that were not specifically designed for
military use,".57 "to keep" means an individual right "to possess[] arms, for
militiamen and everyone else,"58 and "bear Arms" refers to the "carrying of
weapons outside of an organized militia., 59 In so reasoning, the Court held
that the Second Amendment grants an "individual right to possess and
carry weapons in case of confrontation.,
60
1. Scope of the Holding in Heller
The Supreme Court proffered that the right to bear arms is not an
absolute right and is subject to some restriction. The Court held that the
52 15 U.S.C. § 7901(a)(2) (2006). The purpose of this statute, under Congress' Commerce Clause
power and in the interest of protecting free enterprise, is to protect lawful gun manufacturers from
liability for harm caused by individuals who own guns. Id. § 7901(a)(3)-(8).
53 See D.C. CODE §§ 7-2501.01(12), 7-2502.01(a), 7-2502.02(a)(4) (2001).
14 Heller, 554 U.S. at 577.
" Id. at 577-78.
'6 Id. at 579-80.
"Id. at 581.
8Id. at 583.
59 Id. at 584.
6o Id. at 592.
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type of weapons protected by the Second Amendment is restricted to those
"in common use at the time," which means the government may restrict the
possession of "sophisticated arms that are highly unusual in society at
large.' The Court further held that the opinion should not be read to
"cast doubt on longstanding prohibitions on the possession of firearms by
felons and the mentally ill, or laws forbidding the carrying of firearms in
sensitive places such as schools and government buildings, or laws
imposing conditions and qualifications on the commercial sale of arms. 62
These evinced, presumptively permissible restrictions indicate that the
Court believes that some reasonable restrictions on the Second
Amendment are constitutional. However, as a matter of law, all that is
known for certain is that the Second Amendment protects the right of
individuals to keep and bear a handgun, in the home, for self-defense.
The second limit to the right recognized in Heller is based on the reach
of the statutes in question and the scope of the constitutional review of
District of Columbia laws. The laws in question, in the words of the Court,
"totally ban[] handgun possession... [and] amount[] to a prohibition of an
entire class of 'arms' that is overwhelmingly chosen by American society
for [the] lawful purpose [of self-defense]," which is an "inherent
right.., central to the Second Amendment ... ,,6 Furthermore, the
statute in question contained a licensing mechanism in addition to the
nearly outright ban on weapons possession; however, the plaintiffs did not
specifically challenge the licensing mechanism and therefore the Court did
not assess the constitutionality of such restrictive licensing schemes.
64
Based on this language, the scope of the holding is further limited to the
possession of handguns for the purpose of self-defense and bears no
precedential value as to the constitutionality of gun-licensing schemes.
The third limit of the holding in Heller is the location where one may
possess a handgun for self-defense purposes. The Court found that the
District of Columbia "prohibition extends ... to the home, where the need
for defense of self, family, and property is most acute., 65 The Court also
held that "handguns are the most popular weapon chosen by Americans for
self-defense in the home, and a complete prohibition of their use is
invalid," 66 thereby suggesting a limitation of their holding to prohibitions
on handguns in the home, or alternatively, proffering that statutes which
restrict the right to possess a (hand)gun in the home will be more suspect
than those that restrict the right to possess a (hand)gun elsewhere.
61 Id. at 627 (quoting United States v. Miller, 307 U.S. 174, 179 (1939)).
62 Id. at 626-27.
63 Id. at 628.
4Id. at 630-31.
6 Id. at 628.
6Id. at 629.
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2. Allusions to a Level of Scrutiny
Notwithstanding the holding that the Second Amendment right to bear
arms is a fundamental, individual, constitutional right, the Court
nonetheless failed to establish a level of scrutiny to guide future courts,
legislators, and litigants as to how gun-control legislation will be assessed
with respect to the validity of limitations on the right. Indeed, the Court
held that "[u]nder any of the standards of scrutiny that we have applied to
enumerated constitutional rights, banning from the home 'the most
preferred firearm in the nation to 'keep' and use for protection of one's
home and family,' . . . would fail constitutional muster., 67  Generally,
assuming rights are not absolute and may be abridged to pursue a public
objective, courts will use varying levels of scrutiny to assess the
constitutionality of laws abridging constitutional rights. However, the
Court failed to elucidate which of the standards of scrutiny should apply.
Justice Breyer in his dissent opined that the law in question would
certainly pass a rational-basis test,68 and further criticized the majority for
69failing to establish any standard of scrutiny to guide future courts. While
the majority agreed that the law would pass a rational-basis test 70 (note that
this is not contrary to the Court's statement above that an absolute ban on
handguns in the home for self-defense would fail under any of the levels of
scrutiny previously applied to enumerated rights, because rational-basis
scrutiny has never been applied to a fundamental right),7' it readily
dismissed the possibility that the Second Amendment will be subject to
rational-basis scrutiny, because rational-basis scrutiny cannot "be used to
evaluate the extent to which a legislature may regulate a specific,
enumerated right ... [including] the right to keep and bear arms. 72
Justice Breyer also discussed the possibility of a strict-scrutiny analysis
for gun-control legislation, writing that such a level of scrutiny "would
require reviewing with care each gun law to determine whether it is
narrowly tailored to achieve a compelling governmental interest. 73 If the
courts were to try to apply strict scrutiny, "almost every gun-control
regulation will seek to advance . . . a primary concern of every
government-a concern for the safety and indeed the lives of its
citizens. 74 Therefore, in Justice Breyer's view, a strict-scrutiny review
67 Heller, 554 U.S. at 628-29 (footnote omitted) (citing Parker v. District of Columbia, 478 F.3d
370, 400 (2007)).
68 Id. at 687-88 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
61 Id. at 687.
70 Id. at 628 n.27 (majority opinion).
71 See infra Section I.C.
72 Heller, 554 U.S. at 628 n.27 (citing United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152-53
n.4 (1938)).
73 Id. at 688 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (internal quotation marks omitted).
74 Id. at 689 (internal quotation marks omitted).
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would be superfluous because protecting the safety of citizens is always a
compelling state interest.
Lastly, Justice Breyer suggested that none of the traditional levels of
scrutiny is satisfactory to assess the constitutionality of laws restricting the
Second Amendment right.75 Instead, he proposed an interest-balancing
inquiry, where judges weigh whether a "statute burdens a protected interest
in a way or to an extent that is out of proportion to the statute's salutary
effects upon other important governmental interests., 76 However, once
again the majority dismissed Justice Breyer's attempt to assign a level of
scrutiny, explaining that
no other enumerated constitutional right .. .has been
subjected to a freestanding "interest-balancing" approach.
The very enumeration of the right takes out of the hands of
government-even the Third Branch of Government-the
power to decide on a case-by-case basis whether the right
is really worth insisting upon. A constitutional guarantee
subject to future judges' assessments of its usefulness is no
constitutional guarantee at all. Constitutional rights are
enshrined with the scope they were understood to have
when the people adopted them, whether or not future
legislatures or (yes) even future judges think that scope too
broad.... The First Amendment contains the freedom-of-
speech guarantee that the people ratified, which included
exceptions for obscenity, libel, and disclosure of state
secrets, but not for the expression of extremely unpopular
and wrong-headed views. The Second Amendment is no
different. Like the First, it is the very product of an
interest-balancing by the people-which Justice Breyer
would now conduct for them anew. And whatever else it
leaves to future evaluation, it surely elevates above all
other interests the right of law-abiding, responsible
citizens to use arms in defense of hearth and home.77
With these words, the Court held the District of Columbia laws
unconstitutional, but left unanswered the level of scrutiny to be used by
future courts in determining the constitutionality of laws that restrict the
Second Amendment right to bear arms.
75 See id.
76 Id. at 689-90.
77 Id. at 634-35 (majority opinion).
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B. McDonald v. City of Chicago
During the 2009-2010 term, the Supreme Court granted certiorari to
review the Seventh Circuit's holding in McDonald v. City of Chicago that
the individual right to bear arms defined in Heller does not apply to a
municipal law and is not incorporated by the Fourteenth Amendment Due
Process Clause. 78 Finding that the right to bear arms is incorporated, the
Supreme Court elucidated the incorporation ambiguity left in the wake of
the Heller decision. The Court still failed, however, over the objection of
several Justices and amici, to establish a level of scrutiny to guide future
courts and legislators in assessing the constitutionality of existing and
proposed municipal, state, and federal gun-control legislation.
As in Heller, the City of Chicago had an ordinance that effectively
prohibited the possession of a firearm, requiring that every handgun must
be registered, but essentially prohibiting the registration of most
handguns.79 McDonald and several other litigants challenged the law as
repugnant of the Second Amendment because it infringed their right to
keep a firearm in their homes for self-defense purposes and argued that
handguns are actually necessary to protect them from criminals. 80  The
petitioners proffered two arguments for incorporation: (1) that the right to
bear arms is one of the privileges or immunities protected by the
Fourteenth Amendment and the very narrow reading of that clause in the
Slaughterhouse Cases should be overturned; or, (2) that the Fourteenth
Amendment Due Process Clause incorporates the Second Amendment
right identified in Heller.81 The Court ultimately incorporated the Second
Amendment right to bear arms and held it applicable to the states by virtue
of the Due Process Clause.82
1. Procedural Posture
McDonald is the consolidation of several lawsuits that were filed after
the decision in Heller. Otis McDonald and others (the "Chicago
Petitioners") filed suit in the United States District Court for the Northern
District of Illinois challenging the constitutionality of Chicago's
aforementioned restrictions on the possession of firearms in the home for
self-defense purposes.84 In addition, the National Rifle Association
78 NRA v. City of Chicago, 567 F.3d 856, 859 (7th Cir. 2009), rev'd McDonald v. City of
Chicago, 130 S. Ct. 3020 (2010).
79 CHICAGO, ILL., MUN. CODE §§ 8-20-040(a), 8-20-050(c) (2009), invalidated by McDonald, 130
S. Ct. 3020.
80 McDonald, 130 S. Ct. at 3026.
S Id. at 3028.
82 Id. at 3026.
83 Id. at 3020, 3027.
84 Complaint at 9, McDonald v. City of Chicago, 2008 WL 2626944 (N.D. I11. 2008) (No.
08CV03645), 2008 WL 2571757.
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("NRA"), in conjunction with several residents of Chicago and Oak Park,
Illinois, filed two lawsuits in the same District Court--one against the City
of Chicago and one against the Village of Oak Park--challenging their
85prohibitions on the possession of handguns for self-defense.
The Chicago Petitioners were all lawful gun owners, residing in
Chicago but forced to keep their firearms elsewhere due to Chicago laws
that effectively prevented the registering of a handgun.86 In their initial
filing with the district court, the Chicago Petitioners expressed a desire to
possess a handgun for self-defense, and alleged that they were prohibited
from doing so for fear of arrest and prosecution.87 They filed suit the same
morning the Heller decision was announced,8 alleging that the Second
Amendment "[a]t a minimum .. .guarantees individuals a fundamental
right to possess a functional, personal firearm, including a handgun, within
the home"8 9 and that the Chicago handgun registration laws deprived
citizens of their right to bear arms, which is incorporated against the states
by virtue of the Fourteenth Amendment Due Process Clause or Privileges
or Immunities Clause. 90
The NRA lawsuit against Chicago named the NRA and four
individuals as plaintiffs. Similar to McDonald, two of the plaintiffs
lawfully owned guns that they stored outside of Chicago, but wished to
store in their Chicago homes, and two of the plaintiffs resided in Chicago
and wished to obtain a handgun for self-defense purposes.91 Like the
plaintiffs in McDonald, the Heller plaintiffs expressed a fear of arrest and
prosecution. 92 The NRA lawsuit against the Village of Oak Park, Illinois is
substantially similar, though the named-plaintiffs are residents of Oak
Park, and the Oak Park ordinance explicitly prohibited the possession of
firearms. 93
The District Court Judge denied the McDonald plaintiffs' motions for
summary judgment and motion to narrow the legal issues, reasoning that
the Seventh Circuit had previously held that the Second Amendment is not
incorporated and that judicial precedent prohibits the district court from
drawing an opposite conclusion.94 Consolidating the two NRA suits, the
85 NRA v. Viii. of Oak Park, 617 F. Supp. 2d 752, 752 (N.D. Il1. 2008).
86 Complaint, supra note 84, at 4.
87 Id. at 3-6.
88 Oak Park, 617 F. Supp. 2d at 752.
89 Complaint, supra note 84, at 6.
90 ld. at 9-10.
9' Complaint for Declaratory Judgment and Injunctive Relief at 3-9, NRA v. City of Chicago, 755
F. Supp. 2d 982 (N.D. I11. 2010) (No. 108CV03697), 2008 WL 2840911.
92 Id.
93 See Complaint for Declaratory Judgment and Injunctive Relief at 3-6, Oak Park, 617 F. Supp.
2d 752 (N.D. I11. 2008) (No. 108CV03696), 2008 WL 2840910.
94 McDonald v. City of Chicago, No. 08 C 3645, 2008 WL 5111112, at *1 (N.D. I11. Dec. 4,
2008).
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same district court Judge likewise rejected the reqt ,.st for declaratory and
injunctive relief for the same reasons stated in McDonald.95  All three
groups of plaintiffs sought appellate review from the Seventh Circuit.
In affuming the district court's rejection of the plaintiffs claims, the
Seventh Circuit carefully noted that many of the cases that they were
forced to rely on in holding that the Second Amendment is not
incorporated are now "defunct., 96  Nevertheless, the court followed
precedent with "direct application" and affirmed the lower court decision. 97
From this ruling, McDonald petitioned for certiorari, which was granted on
September 30, 2009.98
2. Holding in McDonald
The appeal to the Supreme Court raised two primary issues of law: (1)
whether the right to keep and bear arms is one of the "privileges or
immunities" of citizenship that cannot be denied because of the Fourteenth
Amendment; or (2) whether the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment incorporates the Second Amendment right to bear arms. 99
The Court summarily refused to consider the first issue on the basis that it
would unnecessarily disturb the Court's earlier holding in the
Slaughterhouse Cases, since the question of state infringement of
Constitutional rights protected by the Fourteenth Amendment has
consistently been analyzed under the Due Process Clause, rather than the
Privileges or Immunities Clause. 00
The Court next sought to determine whether the Second Amendment
right to bear arms is one of the rights that can and should be incorporated.
As discussed previously, the modem theory of selective incorporation,
which began around 1963,'0' incorporates a Bill of Rights guarantee if the
Court deems it "fundamental [to the] principles of liberty and justice which
lie at the base of all our civil and political institutions."' °2 Relying on its
earlier decision in Heller, the Court held that self-defense is the "central
component" of the Second Amendment right to bear arms, and that self-
defense is a basic right that is recognized in our legal system and many of
"' Oak Park, 617 F. Supp. 2d at 754.
96NRA v. City of Chicago, 567 F.3d 856, 858 (7th Cir. 2009), rev'd McDonald v. City of
Chicago, 130 S. Ct. 3020 (2010).
97 
Id. at 857.
98 McDonald v. City of Chicago, 130 S. Ct. 48 (2009).
99 McDonald, 130 S. Ct. at 3028.
"o Id. at 3030-31.
101 See Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 341 (1963) ("In many cases ... this Court has
looked to the fundamental nature of original Bill of Rights guarantees to decide whether the Fourteenth
Amendment makes them obligatory to the States.").
102 Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 148 (1968) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting
Powell v. State ofAlabama, 287 U.S. 45, 67 (1932)).
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those that came before us.' 03 Furthermore, the right to bear arms is deeply
rooted in American history and, amongst the Founding Fathers, was
considered one of those fundamental principles worthy of constitutional
protection.1°4  Based on this analysis, the Court held that the Second
Amendment right to bear arms recognized in Heller, and presumably
subject to the very same limitations as outlined in Heller,'°5 is incorporated
through the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
10 6
However, as in Heller, the Court again failed to establish the level of
scrutiny that should be employed by lower courts in assessing the
constitutionality of laws that abridge the right to bear arms.
IV. THE POST-MCDONALD SECOND AMENDMENT
The right to bear arms has always been the distinctive
privilege of freemen. Aside from any necessity of self-
protection ... it represents . . . power coupled with the
exercise of a certain jurisdiction .... [I]t was not necessary
that the right to bear arms should be granted in the
Constitution, for it had always existed.'0 7
The holdings in Heller and McDonald may have an incredible impact
on constitutional law jurisprudence for decades to come, and may even
signal the demise of the Slaughterhouse Cases, a result many constitutional
law scholars are acutely interested in.108  However, it is likely that the
majority of litigation and legislation in the very near future will revolve
around three primary issues: (1) What is the scope of the Second
Amendment right to bear arms?; (2) What reasonable restrictions on one's
right to bear arms are constitutionally permissible?; and (3) What level of
scrutiny must the Supreme Court and lower courts apply when assessing
the constitutionality of laws that restrict the right to bear arms?
"03 McDonald, 130 S. Ct. at 3036 (internal quotation marks omitted).
104 Id. at 3036-37. For an historical analysis of the Second Amendment, see for example id. at
3036-42; District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 605-34 (2008).
105 See also supra Section III.A. 1.
106 McDonald, 130 S. Ct. at 3050.
10 7 JOHN ORDRONAUX, CONSTITUTIONAL LEGISLATION IN THE UNITED STATES: ITS ORIGIN, AND
APPLICATION TO THE RELATIVE POWERS OF CONGRESS, AND OF STATE LEGISLATURES 241-42
(Philadelphia, T. & J. W. Johnson & Co. 1891).
10s See Brief of Constitutional Law Professors as Amici Curiae in Support of Petitioners at 35,
McDonald, 130 S. Ct. at 3020 (No. 08-1521), 2009 WL 2028912. Because nearly every provision of
the Bill of Rights has been incorporated, and Justice Black argued in Adamson and Duncan for full
incorporation because of the Privileges or Immunities clause, as we near universal incorporation the
Court may be willing to revisit Justice Black's arguments and overrule or minimize Slaughterhouse.
However, given the reluctance of the Court to revisit Slaughterhouse, this is unlikely.
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A. Scope of the Right to Bear Arms
Based on the facts alleged, the Court in Heller and McDonald
recognized a fundamental, individual right to keep and bear arms-i.e., the
possession of a handgun, in the home, for self-defense purposes-that is
constitutionally protected and is equally immune from unreasonable state,
local, or federal restriction.'0 9 It is also clear that some limitations on the
right are justified. While Heller defined the right, McDonald incorporated
it and clarified some of the justifications for limiting that right through
government regulation. Based on the foregoing analysis of the Heller and
McDonald decisions, however, the Supreme Court has not rejected the
assertion that the right to bear arms protected by the Second Amendment is
an individual right to carry most types of weapons for any lawful purpose.
A handgun may be the most convenient and widely chosen weapon for
self-defense, but that does not mean it is the only weapon to achieve such
an end. The issues in Heller and McDonald were framed as government
restrictions on a citizen's right to possess a handgun, in the home, for self-
defense. Pursuant to long-standing judicial precedent, the Court did not
reach questions that were not raised on appeal and therefore did not
address all of the possible limitations on the right that might be justified. It
is clear that the right to possess a handgun, in the home, for self-defense
was the gravamen of the Heller and McDonald decisions, but it is not the
end of the discussion and the Supreme Court will undoubtedly be called on
to clarify its holding in the future.
That the Court did not explicitly assess all limitations on the right to
bear arms that may pass judicial scrutiny does not mean that the right is
only protected to the extent recognized by the Court. The Court clearly
does not believe this to be the outer limits of the constitutionally protected
right. As noted above, the Court specifically framed the right as one to
possess a weapon in cases of confrontation in the home. The obvious
implication is that such confrontation can happen within the home, but
does not have to, and the weapon of choice for self-defense may be a
handgun, but is not necessarily limited to handguns alone.
The right to bear arms surely extends beyond the home and beyond the
mere possession of handguns. The Court in Heller and McDonald
undertook a comprehensive analysis of the scope and extent of the right.
Quoting Heller, the McDonald Court noted that its holding that the Second
Amendment right to bear arms is incorporated does not cast doubt upon
longstanding regulatory schemes such as "prohibitions on the possession of
'09 See, e.g., Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1, 10-11 (1964) (holding that the Fourteenth Amendment
does not apply to the states "only a 'watered-down, subjective version of the individual guarantees of
the Bill of Rights ....") (quoting Ohio ex. rel. Eaton v. Price, 364 U.S. 263, 275 (1960) (Brennan, J.,
dissenting)).
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firearms by felons and the mentally ill, laws forbidding the carrying of
firearms in sensitive places such as schools and government buildings, or
laws imposing conditions and qualifications on the commercial sale of
arms." 0 In addition, the Court did not overrule Presser, which upheld a
state law prohibiting private, paramilitary organizations,"' nor did it
overrule Miller, which held that "the Second Amendment does not protect
those weapons not typically possessed by law-abiding citizens for lawful
purposes.""12 While the Court was not clear on where and to what extent
the right to bear arms extends, the very fact that the Court took the time to
assess existing case law and statutes restricting the right to bear arms
suggests that the Court accepts that there are constitutionally protected uses
for weapons (other than just handguns) outside of the home. However, in
non-self-defense situations, we will not know for certain the scope of the
right until the Supreme Court provides further guidance.
Nevertheless, is the right, no matter where recognized and regardless
of the type of weapon employed, only a right to bear arms vis-A-vis a
confrontation or self-defense purpose? The Court in Heller framed the
right as one "in case of confrontation"" 13 and, in McDonald, noted that self-
defense is a "basic right"'"1 4 and is the "central component""' 5 of the
Second Amendment right. Furthermore, the Court in McDonald held that
"the need for defense of self ... is most acute in the home ... [and] this
right applies to handguns because they are the most preferred firearm in the
nation to keep and use for protection of one's home and family." 1 6 These
statements could lead some to believe that the right to bear arms is only for
self-defense purposes.
Conversely, in McDonald, the Court actually phrased its holding in
Heller as: "the Second Amendment protects a personal right to keep and
bear arms for lawful purposes,"' 17 strongly implying that even the Justices
view their holding in Heller as more than just a protection of the right to
bear arms for self-defense purposes-indeed, the right extends to all lawful
purposes. Later in the McDonald decision, the Court stated that the
Second Amendment protects, inter alia, "the right to possess a handgun in
the home for the purpose of self-defense," ' 18 and it is this right that is
incorporated by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
1"0 McDonald, 130 S. Ct. at 3047 (quoting Heller, 554 U.S. at 626-27) (internal quotations marks
omitted).
.. Heller, 554 U.S. at 620-21.
..
2 Id. at 625.
13 Id. at 592.
"14 McDonald, 130 S. Ct. at 3036.
115 Id. (quoting Heller, 554 U.S. at 599) (internal quotations omitted).
'16 Id. at 3036 (quoting Heller, 554 U.S. at 628-29) (internal quotations omitted).
7Id. at 3044.
I ld. at 3050.
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However, in so holding, it does not necessarily follow that the right is
restricted solely to this purpose.
Since the Heller and McDonald decisions are not exactly clear as to
the scope of the right that is protected, we must turn to other, less
authoritative sources, to define the right. Justice Stevens, in his McDonald
dissent, claimed that the right asserted in the petition for certiorari is an
"interest in keeping a firearm of one's choosing in the home,"1 9 which
would indicate that the right is limited to possession in the home.
However, as Justice Scalia noted in his concurring opinion,1 20 and as the
petitioners posited in their petition for certiorari, the question presented to
the Court was "[w]hether the Second Amendment right to keep and bear
arms is incorporated .... 121 The posture of the issue presented to the
Court suggests that the right protected by the Second Amendment,
whatever the extent of that right may be, is incorporated.
As Justice Stevens stated in his Heller dissent:
Guns are used to hunt, for self-defense, to commit crimes,
for sporting activities, and to perform military duties. The
Second Amendment plainly does not protect the right to
use a gun to rob a bank; it is equally clear that it does
encompass the right to use weapons for certain military
purposes. Whether it also protects the right to possess and
use guns for nonmilitary purposes like hunting and
personal self-defense is the question presented by this
case.
122
Justice Stevens identified and recognized that the Court left the scope of
the right ambiguous,1 23 which lends credence to the argument that the right
is broader than the Court specifically identified. Indeed, the Court did not
adopt the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia's expansive
scope of the Second Amendment, bestowing a right to carry arms for
"lawful, private purposes."' 12 4  The Heller Court instead narrowed that
definition to cases of confrontation. 
125
Most recently, several lower courts have taken the opportunity to
assess the scope of the right protected by the Second Amendment in light
"' Id. at 3109 n.36 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
120 See id. at 3054 n.5 (Scalia, J., concurring).
121 Petition for Writ of Certiorari at i, McDonald, 130 S. Ct. 3020 (No. 08-1521), 2009 WL
1640363.
122 District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 636-37 (2008) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
123 id.
124 Parker v. District ofColumbia, 478 F.3d 370, 382 (D.C. Cir. 2007).
125 Heller, 554 U.S. at 584.
2012]
of the Heller and McDonald decisions. 126 An overwhelming number of
courts have elected to read the decisions very narrowly to protect only a
right to have a gun in the home for self-defense.
127
Since the question presented to the Court did not specifically limit the
right to the possession of a handgun, in the home, for self-defense
purposes, it would be incongruous (and indeed a flagrant misrepresentation
of the Court's opinion) to limit the extent of the Second Amendment right
to that purpose. Following centuries of tradition, the Court assessed the
specific constitutionality of the statutes in question, as posed by the
petitioners, which prohibited them from keeping handguns in their homes
for self-defense. 12 8 Therefore, while incorporating a general right to bear
arms, the Court also held that the particular statutory scheme in question is
a violation of that constitutional right, but is not the only constitutionally
permissible exercise of that right.129 Neither the text of the amendment nor
the text of the Heller and McDonald decisions indicate or suggest that the
actual right enumerated is inherently limited in time, location, or manner.
The Court held that there is a right to bear arms, and included in that right
is the ability to have a handgun, in the home, for self-defense. 30 In the
final analysis, the right protected by the Second Amendment is most likely
broader than that recognized specifically by the Court, and this Note argues
that the right is an individual right to carry most arms (except those
specifically designed and created for military use), at most times and
places (except certain, sensitive locations where the government has a
legitimate interest in preventing the possession of firearms, such as
schools, federal buildings, courthouses, or post offices), for almost any
lawful purpose (as defined by state, local, or federal law after balancing the
right with the government interest in restricting the exercise of that right).
B. Constitutionally Permissible Restrictions
Implicit in the discussion of the scope of the right to bear arms is the
government's power to restrict that right. Every constitutional right, even
the most fundamental of rights such as this, is subject to some form of
regulation. Chief Justice Parker, of the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial
Court, stated in 1825 that, "[t]he liberty of the press was to be unrestrained,
but he who used it was to be responsible in case of its abuse; like the right
to keep fire arms, which does not protect him who uses them for
126 See infra note 127.
127 See, e.g., United States v. Morsette, 622 F.3d 1200, 1202 (9th Cir. 2010); Mack v. United
States, 6 A.3d 1224, 1236 (D.C. Ct. App. 2010); People v. Dawson, 934 N.E.2d 598, 604-05 (Ill. App.
Ct. 2010); Williams v. State, 10 A.3d 1167, 1177 (Md. 2011).
121 Heller, 554 U.S. at 628-29.
129 Id. at 635.
130 Id.
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annoyance or destruction." 13 ' Today, the Court is equally clear that "the
enshrinement of constitutional rights necessarily takes certain policy
choices off the table ... includ[ing] the absolute prohibition of handguns
held and used for self-defense in the home."'' 32  However, the Court also
stated that the right is not "a right to keep and carry any weapon
whatsoever in any manner whatsoever and for whatever purpose."
133
Therefore, as with most constitutionally protected rights, there must be a
middle ground where the government may restrict the exercise of the right
in a constitutionally permissible manner.
As previously noted, the Court gave a non-exhaustive (and non-
affirmative, because the particular regulatory schemes have not been
assessed post-McDonald) list of regulations that are likely to be
constitutionally reconcilable with the Second Amendment right to bear
arms. Those regulations include prohibiting the possession of weapons by
felons and the mentally ill, forbidding carrying in schools and government
buildings, and restricting the commercial sale of firearms. 134 Indeed, the
right to bear arms uniquely implicates social and public safety concerns to
a greater extent than most other fundamental rights, making this right
particularly open to regulation.' 35 Nonetheless, the Court need not carve
out a particular methodology for regulating the right to bear arms (nor need
this Note exhaustively examine whether one should be devised).
At least one scholar has suggested that the qualifying phrase "well-
regulated militia" in the Second Amendment creates implied textual
support for regulatory authority. 136 Lawrence Rosenthal argues that, since
the Heller Court defined "militia" as all those individuals able to carry
arms and act in concert for the common defense, and the Court held that
the preamble should be consulted to clarify the meaning of the right, the
militia preamble "envisions comprehensive regulation of all who possess
131 Commonwealth v. Blanding, 20 Mass. 304, 314 (1825).
13 Heller, 554 U.S. at 636.
131 Id. at 626.
134 See supra Section [V.A.
135 See Lawrence 0. Gostin, The Right to Bear Arms: A Uniquely American Entitlement, 304 J.
AM. MED. ASS'N 1485, 1485 (2010) (noting that freedom of speech, press, religion, assembly, and
petition are critical to the fulfillment of personal autonomy, dignity, and political equality; whereas, the
right to bear arms does not have the same intrinsic value and is instead a right to possess and use an
inherently dangerous consumer product).
136 Lawrence Rosenthal, Second Amendment Plumbing After Heller: Of Standards of Scrutiny,
Incorporation, Well-Regulated Militias, and Criminal Street Gangs, 41 URB. LAW. 1, 80-81 (2009).
Contra Patrick J. Charles, Scribble Scrabble, the Second Amendment, and Historical Guideposts: A
Short Reply to Lawrence Rosenthal and Joyce Lee Malcolm, 105 Nw. U. L. REV. COLLOQUY 227, 244
(2011), http://www.law.northwestern.edu/lawreview/colloquy/201 I/6/LRCoI1201 I n6Charles.pdf
(asserting that the Second Amendment's preamble in no way "refers to the general regulation of 'arms,'
for this understanding of the phrase 'well-regulated militia' is not at all supported by the historical
record").
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and carry firearms.' 37 The militia qualifier is unique amongst enumerated
rights. No other right has such a perambulatory statement attached. When
read in conjunction with Rosenthal's article, some may surmise that the
Second Amendment is uniquely crafted to allow more government
interference than other enumerated rights. This assertion seems foreclosed
by the Court's decisions in both Heller and McDonald.
Since the Court used a textual and historical analysis to interpret and
incorporate the Second Amendment, perhaps a similar historical analysis
will shed light on which reasonable government restrictions will be
permissible. There were myriad constitutional restrictions in effect prior to
the Fourteenth Amendment which were struck down post-incorporation
doctrine; 138 however, the fact that the federal government has permissibly
regulated gun ownership notwithstanding the Second Amendment's
enforceability against the federal government, and has left to the states the
opportunity to further regulate gun ownership and use, means this
legislative history may be indicative of the kinds of restrictions that will be
permitted. Congress generally legislates with knowledge of its limitations
and courts in turn give great deference to congressional acts. Of course,
this assumes that the enunciation of the protected right in McDonald and
Heller will not affect the constitutionality of existing federal gun-control
regulations-a question outside of the scope of this Note, but likely to arise
in future litigation.
The analysis of the Second Amendment must naturally begin before its
passage; the question, then, is what was the original understanding of the
right to bear arms that the Founding Fathers sought to enshrine in the
Second Amendment? The pre-America English Bill of Rights recognized
the "true, ancient and indubitable right" of (Protestant) English subjects to
"have Arms for their Defence and suitable to their Condition.' 139
Similarly, William Blackstone, the famed British jurist often cited by the
Supreme Court, noted that English subjects were entitled to the right of
having and using arms for self-preservation and defense. 140
Revolutionary War-era Americans were heavily influenced by the
English common law and, in adopting the Bill of Rights, "held the
individual right to have and use arms against tyranny to be
fundamental.'' Similarly, the Federalist papers also speak of the right to
bear arms. In The Federalist No. 28, Hamilton opined, "[i]f the
137 Rosenthal, supra note 136, at 81.
138 See CHEMERNSKY, supra note 28, at 515-17 (discussing cases in which the Court held that the
Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment prohibited states from certain actions).
139 An Act declaring the Rights and Liberties of the Subject and Setleing the Succession of the
Crowne, 1 Gul. & Mar., Sess. 2, c. 2 (1689).
140 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES * 139.
141 STEPHEN P. HALBROOK, THAT EVERY MAN BE ARMED: THE EVOLUTION OF A
CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT 55 (1984).
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representatives of the people betray their constituents, there is then no
resource left but in the exertion of that original right of self-defense, which
is paramount to all positive forms of government . *.. .4 While these
historical references speak most acutely to the right to bear arms to defend
against a tyrannical government, there is an inherent right to have arms for
other purposes as well.
1 43
The initial proposal of a bill of rights, offered in the House of
Representatives by James Madison on June 8, 1789, included the following
proposal: "The right of the people to keep and bear arms shall not be
infringed .... ,144 Writing about the proposed Bill of Rights, Congressman
Fisher Ames wrote that "[t]he rights of conscience, of bearing arms, of
changing the government, are declared to be inherent in the people.' 45
Similarly, Senator William Grayson wrote that "a string of amendments
were presented to the lower House; these altogether respected personal
liberty."'' 46  Indeed, when Samuel Adams brought the proposed
amendments to Massachusetts, he noted that the Constitution should never
be "construed to authorize Congress... to prevent the people of the United
States, who are peaceable citizens, from keeping their own arms ....
Shortly after ratification of the Second Amendment in 1791, Congress
passed a standing militia statute, which required most able-bodied (white)
men, ages eighteen to forty-five, to be enrolled in a "Uniform Militia" and
to present themselves with "a good musket or firelock.'0 48  The very
passage and wording of this statute indicates that Congress expected that
every (white, male) citizen, of proper age and maturity, already possessed a
firearm. Indeed, at that time, in an agrarian culture, it may have been
expected that firearms were used for purposes other than self-defense, such
142 THE FEDERALIST No. 28 (Alexander Hamilton).
143 See HALBROOK, supra note 141, at 69 ("[T]he right to have weapons for nonpolitical purposes,
such as . . . hunting .. . appeared so obvious to be the heritage of free people as never to be
questioned."). Contra CHARLES, supra note 1, at 71-94; WARREN FREEDMAN, THE PRIVILEGE TO
KEEP AND BEAR ARMS: THE SECOND AMENDMENT AND ITS INTERPRETATION 21-22 (1989). Charles
and Freedman make very compelling arguments in opposition to my historical analysis. While their
analyses as respected legal historians are not without merit, I do not read the Heller and McDonald
decisions to support their well-founded opinions, and therefore do not address the veracity of their
arguments.
144 1ANNALS OF CONG. 434 (1789).
145 1WORKS OF FISHER AMES 54 (Seth Ames ed., 1854) (1809).
146 3 WILLIAM WIRT HENRY, PATRICK HENRY: LIFE, CORRESPONDENCE AND SPEECHES 391
(1891).
47 2 BERNARD SCHWARTZ, THE BILL OF RIGHTS: A DOCUMENTARY HISTORY 681 (1971).
48 An Act more effectually to provide for the National Defence by establishing an Uniform
Militia throughout the United States, 1 Stat. 271 (1792). For a contrary analysis of the 1792 National
Militia Act, see Patrick J. Charles, The 1792 National Militia Act, the Second Amendment, and
Individual Militia Rights: A Legal and Historical Perspective, 9 GEO. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 323, 329-31
(2011).
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as hunting. 149
At that time, myriad state legislatures enacted laws that restricted the
private use and ownership of firearms in conformity with existing state
constitutional guarantees of a right to bear arms (not surprising,
considering the Court had not yet incorporated the Second Amendment).
During colonial times, several urban municipalities had laws that restricted
the discharge of a firearm within the city bounds or during certain days. 150
Other laws, such as those challenged in Miller and Presser, prevented the
transportation of unregistered firearms across state lines and the creation of
paramilitary, extra-governmental militias, respectively. However, none of
these laws, and no colonial or early American laws, entirely prohibited the
ownership, possession, or use of firearms for self-defense, hunting, or
recreation.' 5' Indeed, the Georgia Supreme Court readily held an early
Georgia law that prohibited the open carrying of pistols unconstitutional as
repugnant to the Second Amendment and the Louisiana Supreme Court
assessed a Louisiana law that prohibited the concealed carry of weapons
for Second Amendment constitutionality. 52  These early state supreme
courts, circa 1850, did, in fact, believe that the Second Amendment applied
to the states.
The first federal statutes to regulate the civilian possession of firearms
came over 130 years after adoption of the amendment. 153  These laws
restricted the mailing of firearms capable of being concealed on the person
and prohibited the possession of sawed-off shotguns and machine guns.
154
Given the history of the time, and the rise of organized crime, it is likely
that such laws were adopted as crime-control measures; 55 however, they
149 HALBROOK, supra note 141, at 69.
150 Act of May 28, 1746, ch. 10, 1778 Mass. Sess. Laws 193, 194; 5 N.Y. Colonial Laws, ch. 1501
at 244-46 (1894); Act of Aug. 26, 1721, ch. 245, Acts of Pennsylvania 157-58.
151 Contra Charles, supra note 4, at 23 n.77 (identifying several British laws, colonial and early
American state-laws that regulated and restricted the carrying or discharge of firearms and the
possession of gunpowder; however, none of the laws identified actually amount to an outright
prohibition on keeping arms).
152 Nunn v. State, 1 Ga. 243, 250 (1846) ("The language of the second amendment is broad
enough to embrace both Federal and State governments .... [D]oes it follow that because the people
refused to delegate to the general government the power to take from them the right to keep and bear
arms, that they designed to rest it in the State governments? ... We do not believe that, because the
people withheld this arbitrary power of disfranchisement from Congress, they ever intended to confer it
on the local legislatures."); State v. Chandler, 5 La. Ann. 489, 490 (1850) (holding that the law does not
interfere with "man's right to carry arms in full open view, which places men upon an equality. This is
the right guaranteed by the Constitution of the United States, and which is calculated to incite men to a
manly and noble defence of themselves, if necessary .... ") (citation omitted).
153 An Act Declaring pistols, revolvers, and other firearms capable of being concealed on the
person nonmailable and providing penalty, 44 Stat. 1059 (1927); National Firearms Act, ch. 757, 48
Stat. 1236, 1236 (1934) (codified at 26 U.S.C. § 5861 (2006)).
114 Ch. 757, 48 Stat. 1236, 1236-40.
155 Franklin E. Zimring, Firearms and Federal Law: The Gun Control Act of 1968, 4 J. LEGAL
STUD. 133, 137 (1975).
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did not relate to or speak of the possession or carrying of handguns or other
rifles, granting de facto recognition of the right to possess them. Indeed,
for the most part, the regulation of private ownership and firearm use was
left pointedly to the states for over one hundred years, and yet, as
mentioned above, not one state actually outright prohibited the private
ownership, possession, or carrying of firearms. Similarly, because the
Second Amendment enshrines and protects a right that pre-dates the
Constitution, 156 and history suggests that early Americans viewed the right
to bear arms as one that extended beyond the possession of a handgun, in
the home, for self-defense, the pre-existing right is much broader than that
specifically recognized in Heller and McDonald-just how broad remains
unanswered.
More than 170 years ago, the Supreme Court of Alabama recognized
that "[a] statute which, under the pretence of regulating, amounts to a
destruction of the right, or which requires arms to be so borne as to render
them wholly useless for the purpose of defence, would be clearly
unconstitutional. 157  However, a regulation that falls short of wholly
rendering the purpose of the right useless-thereby not entirely prohibiting
the exercise of the constitutionally protected right-would be permissible
under the Court's analysis in McDonald. The Court even held to this
effect, noting that "if a Bill of Rights guarantee is
fundamental... then ... that guarantee is fully binding on the States and
thus limits (but by no means eliminates) their ability to devise solutions to
social problems that suit local needs and values."1 58 Therefore, there are
strong indications in the McDonald and Heller decisions that some
reasonable restrictions on the right to bear arms are constitutionally
permissible. Unfortunately, the Court gave little guidance as to which
level of scrutiny ought to apply when determining whether a regulation
will pass constitutional muster.
C. Level of Scrutiny
For decades, the Supreme Court has defined, revised, and refined the
levels of scrutiny used to assess the constitutionality of state and federal
laws that infringe on a constitutional right.159 The Court has established
levels of scrutiny to guide lower courts in determining how to evaluate the
means-ends nexus between a right and government action that restricts that
right. The Court has primarily implemented three separate tests for
156 District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 592 (2008).
157 State v. Reid, 1 Ala. 612, 616-17 (1840).
158 McDonald v. City of Chicago, 130 S. Ct. 3020, 3046 (2010).
159 See Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 197 (1976) (describing intermediate scrutiny); City of New
Orleans v. Dukes, 427 U.S. 297, 303 (1976) (describing the rational-basis level of scrutiny); NAACP v.
Button, 371 U.S. 415, 438 (1963) (describing strict scrutiny).
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determining whether restrictions on constitutional rights are proper:
rational-basis scrutiny, intermediate scrutiny, and strict scrutiny; each
requires a more compelling demonstration of the need for the limitation in
question than the prior does. However, the Court has selectively used
different levels of scrutiny that do not fall within these three categories,
depending on the right itself, the interest asserted in restricting that right,
and the degree of invasiveness of the restriction. 60 This Note argues that it
is one of these alternative tests, referred to herein as the "sliding scale
test," that should be the proper level of scrutiny for regulations restricting
the Second Amendment right to bear arms.
Rational-basis scrutiny is the least restrictive level of scrutiny and
requires only that the legislative restriction on the right be "rationally
related to a legitimate state interest.'0 61  In order to pass intermediate
scrutiny, the law "must serve important governmental objectives and must
be substantially related to achievement of those objectives.' 62
Historically, intermediate scrutiny has been employed for equal protection
challenges, particularly gender-based classifications, 63 illegitimacy, 164 and
First Amendment regulations that target the time, manner, and place, but
not content, of speech. 65 Lastly, strict scrutiny requires that, in order for a
law to be upheld, it must be necessary to achieve a "compelling state
interest."
166
Rather unusually, the Court in Heller explicitly refused to establish a
level of scrutiny, even at Justice Breyer's insistence, 67 and the Court in
McDonald did not even mention levels of scrutiny in its majority opinion.
This is unusual because the possession of firearms is likely to be one of the
select-few constitutional rights that is heavily regulated and restricted. If
restriction and regulation is not constitutionally permissible, then the
Heller and McDonald decisions call into question every state and federal
gun-control law in existence.
While the Court did not establish what the level of scrutiny is, it did
tell us what it is not. The Court summarily rejected a rational-basis test.
Citing the famous footnote four in Carolene Products,'68 the Court opined
that a rational-basis test cannot be used "to evaluate the extent to which a
16 See, e.g., United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938) (identifying a
new level of review comprised of "more searching judicial inquiry" than rational basis, but not rising to
the level of intermediate scrutiny).
'6' Dukes, 427 U.S. at 303.
162 Craig, 429 U.S. at 197.
163 Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71, 75 (1971).
16 Reed v. Campbell, 476 U.S. 852, 854-56 (1986).
165 City of Renton v. Playtime Theatres, Inc., 475 U.S. 41, 46-47 (1986).
166 NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 438 (1963).
167 District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 634-35 (2008).
168 United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 152 n.4 (1938).
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legislature may regulate a specific, enumerated right. '169 The Court's
holdings in Heller and McDonald leave no doubt that the Second
Amendment right to bear arms is a specific, enumerated right, and
therefore will not be subject to rational-basis scrutiny.
As mentioned above, only one justice, Justice Breyer in Heller,
suggested a standard of review, and he lambasted the majority for not
establishing one in their opinion.1 70  In fact, the Court faced Justice
Breyer's dissent directly, and flatly rejected his proposed "interest-
balancing" approach, but still refused (or neglected) to affirmatively
establish a level of scrutiny. Justice Breyer's approach would leave the
balancing of the citizen's constitutional right and the government's interest
in restricting that right to the judiciary, where the judge weighs "whether
the statute burdens a protected interest in a way or to an extent that is out
of proportion to the statute's salutary effects upon other important
governmental interests. '71 The majority rejected this approach because it
calls on the judiciary to decide, on a case-by-case basis, whether a
constitutional right is actually worth insisting upon, and no other
enumerated right has been subjected to such an interest-balancing test.
1 72
Conversely, as also described above, the Court mentioned some
specific, presumptively lawful, regulations and restrictions on the right to
bear arms-including prohibitions on carrying firearms in sensitive
locations, amongst others. 173  However, it is difficult to undertake a
complex, contextual analysis of these regulations to see if they would
withstand a high degree of scrutiny, such as strict or intermediate scrutiny.
Moreover, even if one could undertake such an analysis and find that both
regulations satisfy the requirements of strict scrutiny, that still leaves little
indication of what level of scrutiny is required of the regulation.
Intermediate scrutiny is used with regard to First Amendment
regulations that target the time, manner, and place, but not content, of
speech. 74 This means that, at least for purposes of the First Amendment
freedom of speech, which is undoubtedly a fundamental right, there are
multiple levels of scrutiny that may apply, at least one of which falls
outside of the presumption that all enumerated, fundamental rights must
only be reviewed under strict scrutiny.
None of the Second Amendment challenges to-date have been
Fourteenth Amendment Equal Protection challenges, so the Court has not
169 Heller, 554 U.S. at 628 n.27.
170 Id. at 687 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
'
7 1 d at 689-90.
172 Id. at 634 (majority opinion).
173 Id. at 626-27.
174 See City of Renton v. Playtime Theatres, Inc., 475 U.S. at 46-47 (1986) ("[S]o-called 'content-
neutral' time, place, and manner regulations are acceptable so long as they are designed to serve a
substantial governmental interest and not unreasonably limit alternative avenues of communication.").
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yet had the opportunity to determine if, under an Equal Protection analysis,
the Second Amendment can be subjected to an intermediate-level scrutiny.
This means that, if a constitutional challenge to a gun control law arises
through the Equal Protection Clause, the regulation might not be held to
strict scrutiny. However, in Renton v. Playtimes Theatres, Inc.,'175 the
Supreme Court held that "regulations enacted for the purpose of
restraining" a right will "presumptively violate the" right, 17 6 an indication
that if the primary purpose of the law is to restrain a fundamental right, that
statute will be held to a strict scrutiny standard of review. Therefore, any
regulation with the primary purpose (or effective result) of restraining the
right to bear arms, will be held to the highest level of judicial scrutiny,
strict scrutiny. Conversely, any challenge that arises under the Equal
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment (to wit, prohibiting non-
citizens, felons, the mentally ill, or the immature from possessing
weapons), presumably will not be held to a strict scrutiny standard.
The application of two different levels of scrutiny for one fundamental
constitutional right will be a rather novel departure from judicial precedent,
and one only seen in the case of "time, manner, and place" First
Amendment regulations, 177in right to privacy cases, 178 and sexual
liberty/privacy between persons of the same sex. 179 Generally, limitations
of a fundamental right will be subjected to strict-scrutiny review, where the
government must show a compelling interest in restricting the right, must
show that the law is narrowly tailored, and must show that the law is the
least restrictive means possible for achieving the interest. 180 Under this
very thorough and exacting level of scrutiny, most (but by no means all)
laws tend to be deemed unconstitutional if they severely restrict a
fundamental right.
Such a result would be disastrous for the firearm regulatory schemes
already in existence at the federal, state, and local levels. The Due Process
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment "forbids the government to infringe
certain 'fundamental' liberty interests at all, no matter what process is
provided, unless the infringement is narrowly tailored to serve a
compelling state interest.' 81 The government bears the burden of proving
'75 475 U.S. 41 (1986).76
Id. at 46-47.
177 See supra note 174 and accompanying text.
178 Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 877-79 (1992).
179 See, e.g., Lawrence v. State of Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 574-75, 578 (2003) (holding that state
sodomy laws prohibiting sexual intercourse between same-sex couples, if raised under the Equal
Protection clause, are subject to rational-basis scrutiny, but if raised under the Due Process clause, are
subject to a higher level of scrutiny). The right to sexual privacy and liberty is a fundamental
constitutional right. See Planned Parenthood, 505 U.S. at 847 (holding that fundamental rights are not
limited to those rights expressly created by the first eight Amendments to the Constitution).
180 Johnson v. California, 543 U.S. 499, 505 (2005).
'81 Reno v. Flores, 507 U.S. 292, 301-02 (1993).
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that a regulatory scheme can meet the very stringent requirements of the
strict-scrutiny test. 82  Folding the Second Amendment in with those
fundamental rights already afforded strict scrutiny would require the
government to prove the constitutionality of each and every gun control
law. Therefore, it is very unlikely that all infringements on the right to
bear arms will be held to a strict scrutiny analysis. Indeed, the Court has
already held that preventing crime and protecting the safety and lives of its
citizens is a compelling government concern. 83 Thus, even under a strict-
scrutiny standard (after every gun control law is needlessly and wastefully
challenged), there is a de facto presumption that a narrowly-tailored
regulatory scheme devised for the purpose of public safety furthers a
compelling government interest. That leaves the government to prove that
the regulation is narrowly tailored and is the least restrictive means
necessary to achieve that interest.
Such a tortured review of every gun-control regulation seems
irrational, wasteful, and imprudent. Instead, the Court should, and likely
will, evolve a pre-existing, but infrequently invoked, level of scrutiny that
falls somewhere between strict scrutiny and intermediate scrutiny.
In recent years, the Court has increasingly decided due process and
equal protection cases based on a list of factors that do not fit neatly within
the established levels of scrutiny. 184  As discussed below, while often
speaking of the levels of scrutiny directly, the Court employs gradations
within the levels of scrutiny on a case-by-case basis. The proffered sliding
scale scrutiny will balance the burden of government regulation in the
interest of public safety with the fundamental right to bear arms, and will
be a simpler and more fitting level of scrutiny for this unique right.
D. The Sliding Scale Test
The idea of a "sliding scale" test is not exactly new to judicial
philosophy, but has never been explicitly named or applied by the Court.
Likewise, the Second Amendment right to bear arms is the quintessential
clean slate for a sliding scale test. No constitutional right, even the most
precious and savored rights such as freedom of speech and assembly, is
absolute. As evidenced by history, and the Heller and McDonald opinions,
a constitutional right is always subject to some level of reasonable
government restriction. The level of scrutiny applied by the courts in
assessing the constitutionality of regulatory schemes that abridge
constitutional rights realistically assesses what degree of deference the
court will give to legislative judgment. The higher the level of scrutiny,
182 Johnson, 543 U.S. at 505.
183 United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 750, 754-55 (1987).
184 See infra Section iV.D.
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the less deference accorded legislative prerogative and the more "weighty"
the governmental interest required to withstand constitutional scrutiny. 185
The proposed level of scrutiny is, by no means, a cookie-cutter test that
can be extracted from specific cases, as can be more clearly done with
strict and intermediate scrutiny. Instead, it is a hybrid level of scrutiny,
building off that used by the Court in abortion (privacy) and ballot access
cases, combined with what Lawrence Rosenthal refers to as an "undue
burden test,' '186 what Justice Breyer calls an "interest-balancing test,"'
' 87
and what Patrick J. Charles calls an "historical guideposts" test.'88
The idea of a "sliding scale" standard of review can, at the very least,
be traced back to the Supreme Court about thirty years ago. In Regents of
the University of California v. Bakke, 189 the famed graduate school
affirmative action case, Justice Brennan mentioned in a footnote to his
concurring opinion that there is another type of constitutional analysis on a
sliding scale basis that may be supported by established precedent. 90 That
same year, Justice Brennan equated the Court's treatment of First
Amendment protections, where some speech is afforded almost absolute
protection, some speech is entirely prohibited, and some speech is afforded
some protection in between, i.e., to "a sliding scale of First Amendment
protection calibrated to this Court's perception of the worth of a
communication's content."' 191 However, no Supreme Court decision has
explicitly applied sliding scale scrutiny nor called it such.
Eight years after Bakke, Justice Stevens revived the sliding scale
criticism, equating the Court's treatment of constitutional values in a
hierarchal manner,' 92 rather than with equivalent value, to a relegation of
some First Amendment rights to the "low end of the sliding scale."'
93
While Justice Stevens was referring to a sliding scale of rights rather than a
sliding scale of review, it seems apparent that the two must go hand-in-
hand. Similarly, Justice O'Connor has written about "a sliding-scale test
for determining whether a particular set of procedures was constitutionally
185 Norman v. Reed, 502 U.S. 279, 288-89 (1992).
186 Rosenthal, supra note 136, at 82.
187 District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 689 (2008).
188 Charles, supra note 4, at 17.
189 438 U.S. 265 (1978).
190Id. at 357 n.30 (Brennan, J., concurring in judgment).
'91 FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726,763 (1978) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
192 See Valley Forge Christian Coll. v. Am. United for Separation of Church and State, Inc., 454
U.S. 464, 484 (1982) ("[W]e know of no principled basis on which to create a hierarchy of
constitutional values or a complementary 'sliding scale' of standing which might permit respondents to
invoke the judicial power of the United States."). While Valley Forge was about taxpayer standing to
sue, the majority opinion rejected the proposition that for standing purposes under Article III of the
Constitution, some fundamental rights are more or less important than other fundamental rights. Id.
193 City of Newport, Ky. v. lacobucci, 479 U.S. 92, 99 n.1 (1986) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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adequate,' 94 a clear indication that, at least for procedural due process
claims, the Court is already using a form of "sliding scale" review, while
not specifically calling it such.
The most illuminating example of sliding scale judicial scrutiny is the
Court's treatment of ballot access cases. In 2008, Justice Souter
characterized the Court's approach to laws burdening voting rights as a
"sliding-scale" approach, where "the scrutiny varies with the effect of the
regulation at issue.' 95
There is no doubt that the right to vote, like the right to bear arms, is a
fundamental constitutional right inherent in the history of ordered liberty in
this nation.1 96 As such, restrictions on an individual's right to vote must
necessarily serve a "compelling [governmental] interest"197 and any
"severe restriction [must be] narrowly drawn to advance a state interest of
compelling importance,"' 98 indicative of strict scrutiny. However, the
Court has also held that a state has a "legitimate interest in regulating the
number of candidates on the ballot,' 199 indicating that, when the issue is
the right to appear on a ballot and the voters' right to cast a ballot for a
particular candidate, that right is subject to rational-basis review.2 °° In
ballot access and election-related cases, the Court has applied varying
standards depending on whether the restriction is a "severe restriction" or a
"reasonable, non-discriminatory restriction. 20' Therefore, based on the
means sought to exercise the right, and the degree of the state's subsequent
restriction of the right, the Court has assessed the end-result with varying
levels of judicial scrutiny, what this Note calls the "sliding scale."
Abortion provides a second example of the Court effectively using,
and explicitly proscribing, a "sliding scale" to assess the constitutionality
of laws restricting the right to privacy, particularly a woman's right to an
abortion. A woman's right to an abortion falls under the purview of
"personal privacy," a "fundamental" right "implicit in the concept of
ordered liberty. 20 2  However, a woman's right to an abortion is not
"absolute" and is subject to some reasonable regulation to further the
state's interest "in safeguarding health, in maintaining medical standards,
and in protecting potential life. 20 3 As the pregnancy progresses, according
to the court, the weightiness of these interests becomes compelling enough
194 Pacific Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Haslip, 499 U.S. 1, 53 (1991) (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
"s Crawford v. Marion Cnty. Election Bd., 553 U.S. 181, 210 (2008) (Souter, J., dissenting).
196 Ill. Bd. of Elections v. Socialist Workers Party, 440 U.S. 173, 184 (1979).
197 Id.
198 Norman v. Reed, 502 U.S. 279, 289 (1992).
199 Ill. Bd of Elections, 440 U.S. at 184-85.
200 Luben v. Panish, 415 U.S. 709 (1974).
201 Crawford v. Marion Cnty. Election Bd., 553 U.S. 181, 190 (2008).
202 Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 152-53 (1973).
203 Id. at 153-54.
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to warrant state regulation,2°4 an interest-balancing test that cannot be more
aptly named than a sliding scale test.
The state has a "legitimate" interest in maintaining medical standards,
preserving the "health of the mother" and in protecting "potential life, 2 °5
indices of a rational-basis test. However, it is not until a specific point in
the pregnancy that the "legitimate" interest becomes "compelling" enough
that the state may interfere with the fundamental right to privacy and
abridge a woman's right to an abortion. The interest in maintaining
medical standards is always a legitimate interest and a state may prescribe
regulations in order to further that interest.2a 6 However, the state may not
exercise its interest in preserving the health of the mother until the end of
the first trimester, when the state may "regulate the abortion procedure to
the extent that the regulation reasonably relates to the preservation and
protection of maternal health., 20 7  This "reasonable relation" standard
alludes to a level of scrutiny above rational-basis (i.e., rational relation),
but below intermediate scrutiny (i.e., substantially related). Lastly, the
state's interest in protecting prenatal life does not become compelling
enough to warrant state interference until the end of the second trimester,
when the fetus becomes viable.20 8 At this point, a state may entirely
proscribe abortion, except when "necessary" to preserve maternal life.209
Therefore, in the interest of protecting prenatal life, the state may entirely
prohibit abortion during the last trimester, but the interest never outweighs
the mother's life.210
The cases of ballot access and abortion rights provide paradigmatic
examples of a sliding scale standard of review, based on an analysis of the
means sought to exercise the right. Application of this sliding scale review
is well suited to the Second Amendment right to bear arms because some
methods of exercising the right should be afforded higher constitutional
protection than others. Indeed, while many courts will likely try to assess
laws restricting the right to bear arms under the pre-existing levels of
scrutiny, at least one federal court has identified that a new test may be
20 1Id. at 154. Note, however, that the Roe v. Wade decision has been substantially abridged by
Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992), which holds that
"[o]nly where state regulation imposes an undue burden on a woman's ability to make this decision
does the power of the State reach into the heart of the liberty protected by the Due Process Clause." Id.
at 874.
205 Roe, 410 U.S. at 163.
206Id. at 164-65.
207 Id. at 163.
208 id.
2 9 Id. at 163-64.
210 Id. at 164-65 ("[Slubsequent to viability, the state . . . may . . . even proscribe[] abortion
except where it is necessary ... for the preservation of the life or health of the mother.").
[Vol. 44:1339
THE FUTURE OF GUN CONTROL LAWS
necessary. 211
This sliding scale review, as applied to the Second Amendment, is not
the interest-balancing test advocated by Justice Breyer in his Heller
dissent, where the interest of the government in seeking to restrict the right
is balanced with the interest protected by the right.21 2 Instead, the sliding
scale test, congruous with the Court's holding that the central component
(but certainly not the only component) of the right to bear arms is the right
to defend one's self and home, will weigh the means by which and for
which one seeks to exercise his or her right to bear arms with the end result
that the regulation will have on the interests protected by the right.
Since the Heller and McDonald decisions, some lower courts have
assessed the constitutionality of gun laws and addressed the standard of
review quagmire. Several of these courts have adopted or utilized a
standard of review that is similar to the sliding scale that this Note
advocates. To date, the Fourth Circuit, the Seventh Circuit, and the
District Court for the Southern District of West Virginia have all assessed
the constitutionality of federal laws prohibiting persons convicted of
domestic violence from having a firearm.213 In all three cases, the courts
chose to use intermediate scrutiny in light of the circumstances as a whole
and because of the defendants' status of having previous domestic violence
214
convictions. In each instance, the court has ordered that an independent
analysis of the constitutional right asserted, the historical necessity for
regulation in the particular area, and the status of the defendant must all be
considered in determining the appropriate level of constitutional scrutiny.
Similarly, the Third and Tenth Circuits have both recently adopted a
similar independent analysis of whether a law burdens a right within the
scope of the Second Amendment and whether it passes muster under some
"form of means-end scrutiny." 215 In addition, after this Note began to take
shape, the United States District Court for the Southern District of West
Virginia proffered a sliding scale-type review, where the proper approach
is an "individual analysis of the statutory section at issue, a determination
of the appropriate level of constitutional scrutiny to be applied, and careful
scrutiny of the statute in light of the facts before the court., 21 6 Following
211 United States v. Oppedisano, No. 09-CR-0305 (JS), 2010 WL 4961663, at *2 n.2 (E.D.N.Y.
Nov. 30, 2010) ("Neither Heller nor McDonald specifies whether intermediate or strict scrutiny applies
to gun dispossession laws, and it is possible that an entirely new test will develop.").
212 District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 689-90 (2008) (Breyer, J., dissenting).
213 See infra note 214.
214 United States v. Chester, No. 09-4084, 2010 WL 675261, at *6 (4th Cir. Feb. 23, 2010),
vacated on reh'g 628 F.3d 673 (4th Cir. 2010); United States v. Skoien, 587 F.3d 803, 811-12 (7th Cir.
2009), aff'don reh'g en banc 614 F.3d 638 (7th Cir. 2010); United States v. Tooley, 717 F. Supp. 2d
580, 587 (S.D. W. Va. 2010).
215 United States v. Reese, 627 F.3d 792, 800-01 (10th Cir. 2010); accord United States v.
Marzzarella, 614 F.3d 85, 89 (3d Cir. 2010).
216 United States v. Smith, 742 F. Supp. 2d 855, 859 (S.D. W. Va. 2010).
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this approach, the court opined that statutes that affect a right that is
removed from the core of Second Amendment protections should be
subject to intermediate scrutiny, though the court failed to address whether
rights that are not removed from the core of constitutional protections
should conversely be subject to strict scrutiny. 17
As an example of the sliding scale test, since the central component of
the right to bear arms is the right of self-defense,218 any law that infringes
the right to bear arms for self-defense purposes should be necessary,
narrowly tailored, and serve a compelling government interest, 219 i.e., strict
scrutiny must apply. However, since activities such as hunting, target
shooting, or gun collecting are not central components of the right to bear
arms (as of yet), laws that abridge the right to bear arms vis-A-vis these
means of exercising that right should be held to a lower level of scrutiny
that is more deferential to legislative judgment. Likewise, it seems that the
central privileges of the right to bear arms are available most acutely to
"law-abiding, responsible citizens. 22 °  Therefore, when regulatory
schemes seek to regulate or restrict the exercise of the right to bear arms by
citizens who are not law-abiding and responsible, such regulations will be
reviewed with a level of scrutiny below strict scrutiny, but above rational-
basis. This Note recognizes that, in this application, activities such as
hunting, gun collecting, or target shooting can be ancillary to owning a
firearm for self-defense, or can be a separate means of exercising the right
to bear arms. In these cases, laws infringing the right to bear arms must be
narrowly tailored to not unduly restrict the self-defense purpose of gun
ownership while also serving the purported governmental interest in
regulating hunting, collecting, or recreational gun ownership and use.
V. THE DEATH OF ONE-GUN-PER-MONTH LEGISLATION
Statutory schemes restricting the lawful purchase of a handgun to one
purchase every thirty days can be traced back to a South Carolina law
passed in 1976, but repealed in 2004.22 1 Four additional states have
enacted similar laws: Virginia (1993, repealed in 2012),222 Maryland
(1996, though the statute grants the Secretary of the State Police the power
to grant exceptions),223 California (2000),224 and New Jersey (2010).225 In
217 Id. at 866-67 & n.9.
218 District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 628 (2008).
219 While I argue that strict scrutiny should be applied, I do note that no court to date has
explicitly applied strict scrutiny to any Second Amendment challenge.
220 Heller, 554 U.S. at 635.
221 Act of May 19, 2004, 2004 S.C. Sess. Laws Act 242 (2004).
222 VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-308.2:2(P) (2009); 2012 Va. Acts ch. 37.
223 MD. CODE ANN., PUB. SAFETY § 5-128(b) (LexisNexis 2011) (setting thirty-day restriction);
id. at § 5-129(a)(1) (setting power of Secretary of the State Police to grant exceptions).
224 CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 26835(0, 27535(a) (West 2012).
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addition, Massachusetts Governor Deval Patrick filed legislation in mid-
2009 for a one-gun-per-month law that went considerably further than any
one-gun-per-month law currently in force anywhere in the nation.
Governor Patrick proposed legislation that would prohibit the sale, rent, or
lease of more than one "rifle, shotgun, firearm, machine gun, large
capacity weapon or large capacity feeding device in any 30-day period. 226
The one-gun-per-month laws in the aforementioned four states only apply
to handguns.227
Unlike most gun-control laws, which seek to ensure that a potential
gun owner is fit, capable, and properly trained to own, possess, and utilize
a firearm in a safe and lawful manner, one-gun-per-month legislation bears
no relationship to the lawful possession or use of a firearm. On the
contrary, one-gun-per-month laws have the express purpose of limiting the
frequency with which a licensed, lawful gun owner or potential gun owner
can procure a firearm for a lawful purpose. They are restrictions on how
often one may exercise his or her Constitutional right to keep and bear
arms, and no other enumerated Constitutional right has been or can be
limited in this manner. The choice of a thirty-day time period is arbitrary
at best, without any justification for why limiting the purchase of handguns
to twelve-per-year is any different than limiting it to 365 per-year, fifty-
two per-year, or two per-year. Indeed, query whether a law could limit an
accused to one jury trial per month or limit a woman to one child per year;
the government could never impose such a restriction on these rights that
would pass constitutional muster.
This is not to say that any regulatory scheme that places numerical
restrictions on the exercise of a right is per se unconstitutional. Rather, the
restrictions must be tailored to further a government interest to the extent
necessitated by the level of scrutiny applied to the restriction. Under a
strict scrutiny analysis, one-gun-per-month laws do not satisfy this weighty
burden. As such, in the wake of Heller and McDonald, one-gun-per-month
laws should, and likely will, be held unconstitutional as unduly
burdensome on the constitutional right to bear arms.
In order for one-gun-per-month legislation to pass judicial scrutiny, the
laws must, at the very least, serve some important governmental objective,
must be substantially related to achievement of that objective, and must not
unduly burden the lawful exercise of the right. 228  There are myriad
governmental interests implicated in the right to bear arms-the most
notable and compelling being public safety and crime prevention. It is
225 N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 2C:58-2, 2C:58-3 (West 2011).
226 H.B. 4102 at § 7, 186th Gen. Court, 1st Ann. Sess. (Mass. 2009).
227 See supra notes 222-25.
228 The Court has held that the right to bear arms will not be subject to rational basis scrutiny. See
supra note 72.
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clear that a state may restrict convicted felons and the mentally ill from
possessing firearms for this reason.229 However, it is far less clear whether
a competent, sufficiently trained, and properly licensed citizen can be
restricted in the frequency with which they exercise their constitutionally-
protected right to purchase, own, and possess a firearm.
One-gun-per-month laws are particularly suspect because they
overwhelmingly target handguns, the most widely chosen means of self-
defense due to their size and ease of use.23° Since the Supreme Court has
established that the primary component of the right to bear arms is the right
to self-defense,231 under the sliding scale test, any law that restricts the very
essence of this right should be held to the highest level of judicial scrutiny.
This begs the question, how much of an impact on the right to self-defense
is allowed? The newly licensed gun-owner may wish to purchase a
handgun for the bedroom, one for the study, and one to carry on his or her
person. Perhaps he or she wishes to have a small handgun or revolver to
carry on the person, but a larger-capacity, semi-automatic handgun for the
home. Any of these hypothetical situations would require the gun owner to
purchase more than one firearm. As such, limiting the gun owner to one
purchase every thirty days effectively prevents the gun owner from fully
exercising his or her right for at least thirty days. The ultimate test in this
application is how much of an impact the regulation has on the right, and
in some circumstances, it seems the impact is significant, and therefore
should be unconstitutional under strict scrutiny.
In light of Heller and McDonald, it is well within a state's police
power and the federal government's Commerce Clause power to regulate
and restrict the sale of firearms. The Supreme Court proffered presumptive
constitutionality for various regulatory schemes that prevent convicted
felons, the immature, and the mentally ill from purchasing firearms.
2 32
However, each of these presumptively constitutional restrictions on the
right to bear arms seeks to "keep firearms out of the hands of irresponsible
229 See McDonald v. City of Chicago, 130 S. Ct. 3020, 3050 (2010) ("[T]he Due Process Clause
of the Fourteenth Amendment incorporates the Second Amendment right recognized in Heller.");
District of Colombia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 626 (2008) ("[N]othing in our opinion should be taken to
cast doubt on the longstanding prohibitions on the possession of firearms by felons and the mentally
ill ....").230 See Parker v. District of Columbia, 478 F.3d 370, 400 (D.C. Cir. 2007) (citing Gary Kleck &
Marc Gertz, Armed Resistance to Crime: The Prevalence and Nature of Self-Defense with a Gun, 86 J.
CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 150, 182-83 (1995)) ("[T]he pistol is the most preferred firearm in the
nation to 'keep' and use for protection .... ).
"' See Heller, 554 U.S. at 635 ("[W]e hold that the ... ban on handgun possession in the home
violates the Second Amendment, as does its prohibition against rendering any lawful firearm in the
home operable for the purpose of immediate self-defense.").
232 Id. at 626-27.
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persons., 233 Likewise, licensing schemes that require firearm classes, on-
range instruction, and background checks seek to verify that applicants for
firearm licenses are responsible and qualified to carry a firearm, and are
also likely to be held constitutional unless they effectively prohibit or
prevent qualified individuals from exercising their right to bear arms.
These laws provide criteria necessary to exercise one's right to bear arms,
much like there are criteria to vote, to get an abortion, and to exercise other
fundamental constitutional rights. However, query whether a statute
imposing a very large fee on obtaining a gun license, or requiring
prohibitively expensive pre-application training, would be constitutionally
permissible. This is the case with the existing Massachusetts gun-licensing
scheme, which requires citizens to obtain two separate and expensive
licenses in order to carry a handgun, 234-an issue well beyond the scope of
this Note, but ripe for constitutional review nonetheless. Under strict
scrutiny, such a licensing scheme is probably unconstitutional.
Conversely, one-gun-per-month laws do not represent criteria to
exercise a right; they are a limitation on the free exercise of the right for
citizens who may have already met the other statutory criteria necessary to
obtain a license or permit to carry a weapon. Since existing one-gun-per-
month laws overwhelmingly target handguns in particular-the "most
preferred firearm in the nation to keep and use for protection"235-the laws
act as an outright prohibition on the purchase of a second firearm for self-
defense within thirty days of purchasing the first firearm. Therefore, one-
gun-per-month laws not only restrict the core component of the right to
bear arms, they also act as an effective prohibition on the exercise of that
right vis-A-vis the ability to purchase more than one firearm for self-
defense in a particular period of time. Like abortion laws during the first
trimester, 236 one-gun-a-month laws, because they directly implicate the
core principles of a fundamental constitutional amendment, must be strictly
examined. As such, it becomes abundantly clear that, at the very least,
one-gun-per-month laws should be reviewed with strict scrutiny, regardless
of whether the Supreme Court adopts a sliding scale test for the Second
Amendment or utilizes the existing levels of scrutiny.
Having established that one-gun-per-month laws must be reviewed
with strict scrutiny, a court will next have to weigh the constitutionally
protected right against the governmental interest asserted in the regulation.
233 Catucci v. Benedetti, No. 20093998, 2010 WL 4072790, at *2 (Mass. Super. Ct. August 31,
2010).
234 See MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 140, § 129B (2011) ("Firearm identification cards"); id. § 131
("License to carry firearms").
23 Parker, 478 F.3d at 400 (citing Kleck & Gertz, supra note 230, at 182-83).
236 See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 152-53 (1973) (characterizing a woman's right to privacy in
deciding whether or not to terminate her pregnancy as fundamental).
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The purpose of one-gun-per-month laws is to limit the flow of illegal
firearms from states with relatively lax gun laws to states with more
restrictive gun regulations.237 As noted above, the prevention of crime and
gun violence is, without a doubt, a compelling government interest
inherent in the states' police power.238 Indeed, gun violence is a major
problem in America, where someone dies by gun violence every seventeen
239
minutes and over 70,000 Americans are shot non-fatally every year.
However, does the necessary nexus exist between the regulation and the
compelling governmental interest? More specifically, do one-gun-per-
month laws actually further the government's interest in preventing crime
and violence, while only burdening the right to bear arms in a
constitutionally permissible manner?
All legal gun sales in this nation require the completion of a pre-
purchase instant background check to ensure the purchaser is not
prohibited from owning a firearm,240 effectively preventing some convicted
felons and other statutorily defined criminals from legally purchasing
firearms. Among states with one-gun-per-month laws, California,24 1
Maryland,242 and New Jersey 243 all require a permit to purchase and carry a
firearm, though Virginia only required a permit for concealed carry,2"
which was also required to purchase more than one handgun in any 30-day
period.245 Therefore, one-gun-per-month laws merely prevent licensed (or
qualified) citizens from purchasing more than one handgun in a short
period of time. Facially, this limitation would seem to have some effect on
preventing the purchase of multiple firearms for resale to individuals who
will then transport them illegally to other states. Indeed, recent research
shows that one-gun-per-month laws have had marginal success in reducing
the flow of illegal firearms from Virginia.246 Additionally, it is also worth
237 LEGAL CMTY. AGAINST VIOLENCE, REGULATING GUNS IN AMERICA: AN EVALUATION AND
COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF FEDERAL, STATE, AND SELECTED LOCAL GUN LAWS 139 (2008),
available at http://www.Icav.org/publications-briefs/reports-analyses/RegGuns.entire.report.pdf.238 See United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 750, 754-55 (1987) (finding that the compelling
interest of public safety warranted detainment of dangerous convicts beyond their sentence term).239 NAT'L CTR. FOR INJURY PREVENTION & CONTROL, CENTERS FOR DISEASE CONTROL AND
PREVENTION, OVERALL FIREARM GUNSHOT NONFATAL INJURIES AND RATES PER 100,000 (2010),
http://webappa.cdc.gov/cgi-bin/broker.exe; Bob Herbert, The American Way, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 14,
2009, at A23.
24o 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)-(h) (2006).
241 See CAL. PENAL CODE § 26150 (West 2012).
242 MD. CODE ANN., PUB. SAFETY § 5-308 (LexisNexis 2011).
243 N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:58-3 (West 2011); id. § 2C:58-4.
244 VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-308 (2009) (repealed 2012).
241 Id. § 18.2-308.2:2(P)(2)(h) (repealed 2012).
246 Douglas S. Weil & Rebecca C. Knox, Effects of Limiting Handgun Purchases on Interstate
Transfer of Firearms, 275 JAMA 1759, 1759-61 (1996) (noting a 44% decrease, from 34.8% to
15.5%, in firearms recovered in the Northeast originating in Virginia after Virginia's one-handgun-per-
month law). However, for a thorough and comprehensive criticism of the data collection methods that
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noting that, of states with one-gun-per-month laws, only Virginia and
California are large providers of guns used in crimes in other states,
notwithstanding their gun laws.247 Indeed, California has some of the most
restrictive gun laws in the nation, and yet it remains one of the top-five
sources of guns recovered in crimes in other states. 48
While one-gun-per-month laws have shown some marginal success,249
a showing of some success does not make the laws constitutional; but the
failure of the laws to achieve their purpose may be indicative of a break in
the nexus between the compelling government interest and the means
sought to further that interest. In addition, as stated earlier, the very
purpose of one-gun-per-month laws is to prevent the flow of firearms into
the hands of unlicensed citizens. In order to withstand strict scrutiny, the
laws must also be necessary to achieve the goal, must be narrowly tailored,
and must be the least restrictive means to achieve the end result.
These requirements lead to the next question: are there other, less
restrictive means to achieve the same end-result? One-gun-per-month laws
effectively prohibit the purchase of firearms for twenty-nine out of every
thirty days or about 353 out of every 365 days, which is essentially 96% of
the time. The laws are not merely restrictions on the period in which one
may purchase a firearm; they are also a restriction on quantity. While not
an outright prohibition on the purchase of a handgun, which would
undoubtedly be unconstitutional under any level of scrutiny, one-gun-per-
month laws seem so cumbersome and invasive of the right to bear arms
that they serve as a de facto prohibition. Such de facto prohibitions have
previously been held sufficient to implicate the Supremacy Clause 250 and
should likewise be sufficient to show an impermissible restriction on a
fundamental constitutional right, because it is not the least restrictive
means possible to achieve the end-result.
There are numerous mechanisms that have been proposed to reduce the
flow of firearms into the hands of criminals, most of which involve
strengthening federal laws and the enforcement power of the Bureau of
Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms ("BATF"), rather than restricting the
rights of gun purchasers. For example, BATF may only conduct one
unannounced inspection of a gun dealer per-year, even if they identify
show the success of Virginia's one-gun-per-month law, see David B. Kopel, Clueless: The Misuse of
BA TF Firearms Tracing Data, 1999 MICH. ST. L. REV. 171.
247 MAYORS AGAINST ILLEGAL GuNs, THE MOVEMENT OF ILLEGAL GUNS IN AMERICA: THE LINK
BETWEEN GUN LAWS AND INTERSTATE GUN TRAFFICKING 6 (2008), available at
http://www.mayorsagainstillegalguns.org/downloads/pdf/trace-reportfinal.pdf.
248 Id.
249 See Weil & Knox, supra note 246, at 1759-61.
250 E.g., Coal. of N.J. Sportsmen v. Florio, 744 F. Supp. 602, 608 (D.N.J. 1990).
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violations of firearm laws.251 In addition, to bring legal action against a
dealer, BATF must prove that the dealer willfully violated the law-a high
burden that requires years of habitual violations to prove.25 2  More
shockingly, serious record keeping violations at gun dealerships are merely
misdemeanors-which federal prosecutors rarely choose to pursue.253
Furthermore, BATF gun tracing data is not public information, meaning it
cannot even be revealed to a member of Congress as part of a
congressional investigation.254 For years, the Brady Center to Prevent Gun
Violence, a gun-industry watchdog group, has advocated for changes to
these policies, as well as to existing gun control regulations to ensure that
firearms do not easily reach the hands of unlicensed individuals.255
Carefully and prudently modifying these regulatory schemes would serve
to stymie the flow of illegal weapons without unduly restricting one's
Second Amendment right to bear arms.
Lastly, to overcome the burden of proving the regulation is narrowly
tailored, a substantial portion of the burden on the right must advance the
state's goal.256 If a substantial portion of the burden does not serve or
advance the goal of preventing firearms from reaching the hands of
unlicensed or unauthorized individuals, then the law will be
unconstitutional under strict scrutiny. Research shows that only about
eighteen percent of firearms manufactured in the U.S. are used in a
crime25 and a very small number of the nation's 77,000 gun shops sell the
majority of firearms used in crime.258 Furthermore, while multiple-
purchases of firearms are a source of guns used in crime, it is not the only
source. Other sources include straw purchasers and "private" sales at gun
shows, which do not require background checks under federal law.259
Therefore, only a small percentage of guns manufactured and sold in the
United States enter the world of violent crime, and an even smaller
percentage is protected from use in violent crimes through one-gun-per-
251 BRIAN J. SIEBEL & ELIZABETH S. HAILE, BRADY CTR. TO PREVENT GUN VIOLENCE, SHADY
DEALINGS: ILLEGAL GUN TRAFFICKING FROM LICENSED GUN DEALERS 24 (2007), available at
http://www.bradycenter.org/xshare/pdf/reports/shady-dealings.pdf.
252 Id.
2531 d. at 25.
254 Id. at 25, 28.255 Id. at ii, 1-3.
256 E.g., Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 799 (1989). The Supreme Court granted
certiorari to clarify the level of scrutiny for government regulation of the time, manner, and place of
protected speech. Id. at 789-90. The Court held that the "[g]ovemment may not regulate expression in
such a manner that a substantial portion of the burden on speech does not serve to advance its goals."
Id. at 799. From this decision, this Note contends that when a regulation infringes a fundamental right,
a substantial portion of the burden on the right must advance the compelling state interest.
257 NAACP v. Acusport, Inc., 271 F. Supp. 2d 435, 522, 515 (E.D.N.Y. 2003).
258 SIEBEL & HAILE, supra note 251, at 8-9.
2591 Id. at 17, 20.
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month laws. Consequently, there is a strong likelihood that a "substantial
portion" of the burden on the right to bear arms may not advance the
state's goal, and as such, the law would fail to pass constitutional muster.
This does not foreclose all gun regulations, since there may be other
compelling government interests that can be effectuated through
reasonable, narrowly tailored regulation. Furthermore, restrictions that
only touch upon the penumbras of the right, rather than its core principles,
may be held to a less demanding level of scrutiny.
VI. CONCLUSION
For over 200 years, the Supreme Court has taken myriad opportunities
to define, refine, and elucidate those rights guaranteed by the Constitution.
The Court has also strained to balance important government interests
against the rights of the people by creating and applying varying levels of
scrutiny when reviewing legislation. For almost every right protected by
the Constitution, and made applicable to state action through incorporation,
the state and federal governments have sought to restrict the exercise of
those rights in order to further some government interest.
Many rights have been incorporated against the states over the past
eighty-five years, and the Second Amendment right to bear arms is the
most recent addition to that family. Like many rights that are newly
incorporated, Second Amendment jurisprudence is in its infancy and will
continue to evolve throughout the years to come. Some of the questions
left unanswered by the Heller and McDonald decisions include: What
exactly is the right protected by the Second Amendment? To what degree,
and for what purposes, may the government (state and federal) abridge the
right to bear arms? Moreover, what is the proper level of scrutiny for
assessing the constitutionality of laws that impinge upon the right to bear
arms?
By means of a thorough and comprehensive evaluation and
interpretation of the majority, concurring, and dissenting opinions in Heller
and McDonald, this Note concludes that the right to bear arms is an
historical right that pre-dates the Constitution. Enactment of the Second
Amendment, then, was a means to secure the right for future generations of
Americans. Like the pre-independence colonists, Americans today have a
guaranteed right to bear arms that extends well beyond a collective right
vis-A-vis a well-regulated militia or simply a right to possess a firearm for
self-defense. Instead, the right enshrined in, and protected by, the Second
Amendment is a right to purchase, own, and carry almost any commonly
available weapon, in almost any locale, and for any lawful purpose.
Of course, like every other fundamental constitutional right, it is not
unlimited and unqualified. The Heller and McDonald Courts were clear
that some government regulation of, and restriction on, the right to bear
arms is appropriate and necessary. The government has a compelling
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interest in protecting the safety and security of the free state, and in
exercising that interest, may restrict the sale of certain firearms to minors,
convicted felons, and the mentally ill. Additionally, the government may
entirely prohibit the sale, possession, and use of certain arms used
specifically for military purposes. The government may also establish
criteria for citizens wishing to exercise their Second Amendment right,
including licensing schemes that require training, safety examinations, and
licensing by state officials.
However, the extent to which the government may restrict the right to
bear arms is a question the Court conspicuously left unanswered, giving no
guidance to aid future courts in assessing the constitutionality of laws that
restrict the right to bear arms. Traditionally, such guidance is found in the
level of scrutiny assigned to the right, which establishes how weighty the
government's interest must be to restrict constitutionally a fundamental
right. Because of the nature of the right to bear arms, a fundamental right
that uniquely implicates the government's public safety and security
interests in a manner unseen in any other constitutional right, this Note
proffers that the Court must invoke a little defined and rarely applied
modus operandi of judicial scrutiny, herein called a sliding scale level of
review. Under sliding scale scrutiny, courts must assess the
constitutionality of a regulatory scheme restricting the right to bear arms in
light of the effect it has on the exercise of the core right. The Supreme
Court has identified the right of self-defense as the central component of
the right to bear arms. Any regulation that infringes on a citizen's right of
self-defense must be reviewed with the highest degree of suspicion and
subjected to the most stringent level of scrutiny-strict scrutiny.
Conversely, when a regulation does not touch upon the core principles of
the right to bear arms, but instead merely restricts the penumbras of the
right, such regulations should be granted more deference with regard to the
government's important interests, warranting a lesser level of scrutiny.
In the final analysis, it is only through significant litigation that the
Supreme Court will have the opportunity to refine and clarify the breadth,
depth, and limits of the right to bear arms. However, under no
circumstances should the government's interests ever entirely outweigh
and abridge this core, fundamental constitutional right. As the Supreme
Court takes the opportunity to develop Second Amendment jurisprudence,
it should proceed carefully in weighing the importance of the right to bear
arms, a right so compelling that the Founding Fathers saw fit to secure its
protection in the Bill of Rights. Such guidance is sufficiently and
adequately found in applying sliding scale scrutiny, which will
satisfactorily protect the right to bear arms for future generations while
also allowing the government to continue its important role in protecting
the safety and security of our nation.
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